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BEYOND INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
EXPLORING THE EMERGENCE OF A 
DISTINCTIVE CONNECTION DOCTRINE 
ERIC DANNENMAIER∗ 
Human rights law has begun to offer normative protection for what 
remains of indigenous lands. Yet territory now better defended from 
conquest and encroachment is increasingly threatened by their 
byproducts. Water scarcity, food security, waste deposition, climate 
change—in short, the multiple impacts of industrial development—pose a 
new territorial challenge to indigenous communities that will test the 
reach and capacity of the human rights regime. 
This Article examines that challenge and argues that a solution may lie 
in emerging human rights doctrine recognizing indigenous peoples’ land 
rights not as heirs to a European conception of property, but as peoples 
with a distinctive historical, cultural, and spiritual relationship to the land 
and environment. The Article does not purport to create this doctrine, but 
merely to name it and examine its contours. The author traces multiple 
sources of law that affirm indigenous property rights based on land-
connectedness and proposes, for the sake of analysis, a “distinctive 
connection” doctrine. The article asks: 
1. How has this doctrine been defined and applied in indigenous 
property claims based, in part, on cultural and spiritual land-
relationships; and 
2. Can it be effectively deployed to protect against the “new” 
territorial encroachment: the impact on indigenous communities’ 
environment? 
While a distinctive connection has been repeatedly advanced, its 
contours remain uncertain and it has not been fully deployed to address 
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natural resource and ecological concerns of indigenous peoples. The 
author thus offers an analytic framework within which the connection 
might be further understood, emphasizing its relevance to the 
environment. The article looks at examples of recent indigenous 
environmental cases—an Inuit climate change claim, Western Shoshone 
concerns regarding mining practices and nuclear waste disposal on 
traditional lands, and remedial rights of Inuit communities affected by the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill—to suggest that a distinctive connection doctrine 
may offer a means of addressing environmental impacts bound up with 
indigenous communities’ relationship to the land and environment. The 
author argues this doctrine may thus give rise to a property right beyond 
title and trespass: one that protects the deeper ecological values of this 
distinctive connection. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article looks at the evolution of indigenous peoples’ land rights 
under international human rights law and examines the claim—of 
instruments, tribunals, scholars, institutions, and indigenous advocates—
that indigenous peoples have a unique or distinctive connection to the land 
with deep social, cultural, and spiritual meaning. The claim is not casual or 
incidental but rather integral to the increasing assertion and recognition of 
indigenous land rights at many levels.  
The claim of uniqueness, which the author posits as an emerging 
“distinctive connection doctrine,” draws on social and cultural human 
rights principles, and has helped both to justify indigenous land rights and 
to shape the nature of those rights beyond traditional domestic title and 
tenure. While indigenous sovereignty is often seen as lost long ago, or at 
least highly eroded, the distinctive connection has allowed indigenous 
peoples to lay collective claim to possessory property rights in the absence 
of a sovereign prerogative.  
The Article explores this emerging doctrine, examining the claim of 
uniqueness and asking what its legal significance has been in the evolution 
of indigenous land rights. The author goes further to ask whether the 
doctrine might be deployed more effectively where the unique attributes of 
indigenous peoples are particularly relevant to ecological concerns and 
environmental rights. This latter possibility is explored with reference to 
environmental litigation, where the cultural and spiritual concerns of 
indigenous peoples make them particularly vulnerable to environmental 
harms. 
Part II provides background on the evolution of indigenous land rights 
in international law. It begins by discussing how the term “indigenous” 
has come to be constructed in international law and describing how 
indigenous property and sovereignty were eroded during the period of 
European colonial expansion. This Part then outlines the emergence of 
instruments that have allowed indigenous peoples to reclaim some of their 
lost property rights in the context of human rights law.  
Part III explores these human rights instruments in much greater detail 
to better elucidate how the distinctive relationship has been described and 
asserted in legal and institutional contexts. This is a thick descriptive piece 
that offers some analytical insights, but is intended primarily to highlight 
the claim of a unique connection. 
Part IV examines how the assertion of a distinctive relationship has 
affected the outcome of cases dealing with indigenous land and resource 
rights. This is also a descriptive piece focusing on cases that have 
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employed a distinctive connection doctrine, though without naming it as 
such and without fully examining its implications. Many tribunals assert 
the connection yet fall back on traditional property rights to provide relief 
not unique to indigenous concerns. While collective property claims have 
thus been advanced, tribunals often have not addressed (because they have 
not perceived a need) the deeper implications of rights associated with the 
spiritual and cultural connection of indigenous communities to the land 
and environment.  
Part V considers the work that a distinctive connection seems to be 
doing in the instruments and cases discussed in Parts III and IV—offering 
an analytical framework within which the doctrine might be better 
understood. It also asks how the doctrinal recognition of this distinctive 
relationship might be more fully developed to protect the complex 
interests of indigenous communities relating to the environment. It looks 
at three recent cases where a distinctive connection may be especially 
relevant—an Inuit Circumpolar Conference claim concerning climate 
change, Western Shoshone concerns regarding mining practices and a 
nuclear waste repository on their traditional lands, and remedial rights of 
Inuit communities affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill—to suggest that 
the distinctive connection doctrine may have particular relevance where 
concerns over environmental impact are bound up with a communities’ 
historical, cultural, and spiritual relationship to the land and environment. 
The author concludes that a distinctive connection doctrine, while 
already serving (though innominately) to solidify the still-tenuous 
collective property claims of indigenous peoples, could be deployed in 
service of rights beyond title and trespass. Peoples with a unique 
relationship to the land and natural environment—a relationship tied to 
culture and spiritual tradition as well as livelihood—should be able to call 
upon human rights protection to preserve that relationship; otherwise 
human rights guarantees of economic, social, and cultural protection have 
little meaning for these peoples. The result of this acknowledgement is not 
radical, but calls (as economic, social, and cultural claims do) on 
governments to work toward progressive realization of rights. This means 
at least beginning to focus on environmental impacts on indigenous 
communities and to give those affected standing to defend cultural and 
spiritual values. Finally, the author acknowledges, but leaves for future 
exploration, the implications the doctrine may have for communities 
similarly situated—with deeply rooted relationships to the land—but not 
similarly understood as indigenous. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/2
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II. THE EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS 
The rights of indigenous peoples in international law changed rapidly 
and substantially during the latter half of the twentieth century, and land 
claims were often at the forefront of these changes. Initially, from almost 
the moment that indigenous peoples were formally encountered by 
European states (a moment that, in itself, helps define the word 
“indigenous”),1 legal norms were constructed to deny indigenous peoples 
essentially all sovereignty over the land and resources they traditionally 
occupied and used.2 Indeed, ideas about indigenous sovereignty were often 
co-constructed with norms that denied legal personhood—even 
humanity—to indigenous peoples themselves; these constructs were in 
many ways mutually reinforcing. These ideas about indigenous land rights 
(and about indigenous peoples more generally) began to change 
dramatically following World War II, as the advent of international human 
rights law caused a reexamination of the concerns, status, and treatment of 
an estimated 200 million indigenous people.3  
The most recent statement of international law regarding indigenous 
peoples, the September 2007 U.N. Declaration on Indigenous Rights, 
acknowledges that indigenous peoples have, among other rights: the “right 
to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights 
 
 
 1. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 2. I refer to a “formal encounter” meaning the encounter with Europeans making territorial 
claims. This includes, for example, Portuguese voyages along the African coast in the mid-fifteenth 
century; the voyage of Columbus to the Americas in 1492; and the voyage of Vasco de Gama around 
the coast of Africa to India in 1497–98. There is strong evidence that Europeans encountered the 
inhabitants of the Americas much earlier than Columbus. See generally CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: 
NEW REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS (Knopf 2005). There are also well 
documented European-Asian and European-African encounters many hundreds of years before, 
including commercial encounters along the Silk Road, and military encounters such as the Greco-
Persian conflicts and Roman imperial projects in North Africa. It was the state-sponsored or state-
related encounters in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, that defined more contemporary 
relations between European and non-European peoples and which were later reinforced in the newly 
emerging international law and the conception of sovereignty growing from the Westphalian Peace of 
the seventeenth century. See generally Robert H. Jackson, The Evolution of International Society, in 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS 35 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
 3. This estimate is used by several institutions. See, e.g., Press Release, World Bank, 
Indigenous Culture Fundamental to Global Development: World Bank’s Development Trends and 
Indigenous Peoples’ Forum (Sept. 24, 2004) (on file with author); see also John A. Grim, Indigenous 
Traditions and Ecology, available at http://fore.research.yale.edu/religion/indigenous/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2008). The World Health Organization (WHO) has issued a report putting the number 
at more than 300 million. See World Health Org., Report of the Director-General on Collaboration 
Within the United Nations System and with Other Intergovernmental Organizations, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
A51/22 (Mar. 17, 1998).  
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and fundamental freedoms”;4 the rights of “self-determination”5 and 
“autonomy or self-government . . . relating to . . . internal affairs”;6 and 
“the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”7 Yet despite 
its reach, this latest statement—indicative of indigenous land rights more 
generally—remains constrained by its own terms8 and contested by states 
with large and often dispossessed indigenous populations.9 To appreciate 
the scope of indigenous land rights under current international law, it is 
thus important to explore the history of sovereignty claims with respect to 
indigenous lands, and assess the legacy of this history in human rights 
instruments. It is also useful to begin with some discussion of the term 
“indigenous.” 
A. What is Meant by “Indigenous”? 
The question of who is indigenous and what communities are the 
subject of emerging international law relating to indigenous peoples is 
complex and sometimes contested. Professor James Anaya has provided 
one of the more concise understandings, explaining “the term indigenous 
refers broadly to the living descendants of preinvasion inhabitants of lands 
now dominated by others.”10 This brief reference elegantly highlights both 
the geographic connection of indigenous peoples to traditional lands and 
the fact that they are “engulfed” by a different, and dominant, culture.11 It 
encompasses a broad group of diverse peoples that, he explains, “are 
indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands in 
which they live, or would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of 
 
 
 4. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 U.N. Declaration]. 
 5. Id. art. 3. 
 6. Id. art. 4. 
 7. Id. art. 26. 
 8. The text provides, for example, that “[n]othing in this Declaration may be . . . construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.” Id. art. 46. 
 9. See, e.g., Statements of the Representatives of the Governments of Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the United States at the 107th Plenary 
Meeting of the General Assembly regarding the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 11–27, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13, 2007). The 
comments of Mexico following the approval of the declaration are indicative: “The provisions . . . 
relating to ownership, use, development and control of territories and resources shall not be understood 
in a way that would undermine or diminish the forms and procedures relating to land ownership and 
tenancy established in our constitution and laws relating to third-party acquired rights.” Id. at 23. 
 10. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 2004). 
 11. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/2
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more powerful sectors of society living on the same lands or in close 
proximity.12 
Before Professor Anaya had offered this succinct formulation, a more 
detailed definition was offered in the early 1980s by Jose R. Martinez 
Cobo, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:13 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, 
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial 
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their 
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, 
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions 
and legal systems. 
 This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an 
extended period reaching into the present, of one or more of the 
following factors: 
a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; 
b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; 
c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, 
living under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous 
community, dress, means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.); 
d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, 
as the habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or 
as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language); 
 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. The Cobo Study was written over several years and published as U.N. Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.1-4; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/2/Add.5; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/ 
Add.1-6; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6; U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.1-8; and U.N. 
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 [hereinafter Cobo Study]. These parts are being scanned and added to the 
web site of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and are (or will be) available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/spdaip.html (last visited June 10, 2008). 
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e) Residence on certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of 
the world; 
f) Other relevant factors.14 
This 1986 definition is one of the most cited reference points for 
defining “indigenous,”15 and it shares Professor Anaya’s later emphasis on 
a connection to traditional lands and political subordination to a dominant 
society. While neither Cobo nor Anaya seek to define what particular 
connection to the land helps understand a people as indigenous, both stress 
historical continuity—this connection and its importance—as part of a 
core definition. The Cobo definition goes further in highlighting culture, 
generally or “in specific manifestations” such as “means of livelihood.”16 
Indigenous peoples’ own claims about their relationship to the land make 
reference to spiritual and cultural concerns as well as economic (or 
livelihood) concerns17 
In 1995, the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous People (WGIP) asked 
its chair, Erica-Irene Daes, to prepare “a note on the criteria for a 
definition” of the concept of “indigenous.”18 While the WGIP continued to 
look to Cobo’s definition, many expressed concern that the lack of a more 
formal, accepted definition was being used by governments to deny the 
recognition of indigenous groups.19 Daes complied and prepared a report, 
but backed away from offering a single comprehensive definition.20 
Instead, she offered: 
 
 
 14. Cobo Study, supra note 13, Part III, Conclusion, Proposals, and Recommendations, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983, reprinted at U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add. 4, ¶ 379-80. 
 15. This claim is made in a 2004 U.N. background paper on data collection relating to indigenous 
peoples. See U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Secretariat, Background Paper: The 
Concept of Indigenous Peoples, at 1, U.N. Doc. PFII/2004/WS.1/3 (Jan. 19–21, 2004); see also 
ANAYA, supra note 10, at 10 n.2. 
 16. See Cobo Study, supra note 13, Part III, Conclusion, Proposals, and Recommendations, 
reprinted at E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983, ¶ 380(c). 
 17. See discussion infra Part III.F. 
 18. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub. Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & 
Prot. of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Discrimination Against Indigenous 
Peoples, ¶ 162, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/24 (Aug. 10, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 WGIP Report]. 
The request was later approved by the Commission on Human Rights. See ECOSOC, Sub. Comm. on 
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/21 (Aug. 16, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 
WGIP Report]. 
 19. 1995 WGIP Report, supra note 18, ¶ 38. 
 20. ECOSOC, Sub. Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the 
Rights of Indigenous People, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) (prepared by Erica-Irene A. 
Daes) [hereinafter Daes Report]. 
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[F]actors which modern international organizations and legal 
experts (including indigenous legal experts and members of the 
academic family), have considered relevant to the understanding of 
the concept of “indigenous” include: 
(a) Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a 
specific territory;  
(b) The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which 
may include the aspects of language, social organization, religion 
and spiritual values, modes of production, laws and institutions; 
(c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by 
State authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and  
(d) An experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, 
exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these conditions 
persist.21 
Daes emphasized that these “factors do not, and cannot, constitute an 
inclusive or comprehensive definition.” 22 Instead she explained they “may 
be present, to a greater or lesser degree, in different regions and in 
different national and local contexts.”23 
In a recent comprehensive volume on Indigenous Peoples and Human 
Rights, Professor Patrick Thornberry offers an extended discussion of 
“who is indigenous.”24 Professor Thornberry reflects on the approaches in 
international instruments and reports that the Cobo definition continues to 
function as a “vague gatekeeper” for the WGIP and institutions (such as 
the World Bank), as well as claims and definitions from indigenous 
communities and advocates.25 Thornberry also recounts the competing 
claims advanced after the discovery of one of the oldest human skeletons 
found in North America, near Kennewick, Washington. Attempts to 
classify the skeleton morphologically (it did not appear “related to modern 
American Indians”) as well as efforts by local Umatilla indigenous people 
to repatriate the remains led to a battle between scientists and Umatilla 
 
 
 21. Id. ¶ 69. 
 22. Id. ¶ 70. 
 23. Id. 
 24. PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33–60 (2002). 
 25. Id. at 33. This latter source is particularly important, as the theme of indigenous self-
identification has been an important feature of the interpretation of indigenous rights. See, e.g., infra 
Part IV.A (discussing Awas Tingni) and Part V (discussing Moiwana Village). As Professor 
Thornberry notes in discussing the arrival of Boers and Rehoboth Basters at the WGIP in the 1990s, 
the reliance of self-identification is not without its challenges. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 60. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:53 
 
 
 
 
representatives and “a swamp of fossilized politics, racial myth and 
archaeological angst.”26  
Thornberry explains that “the Kennewick debates suggest four 
interwoven strands in ‘indigenous’.”27 These are (1) “association with a 
particular place;” (2) “prior inhabitation;” (3) “a sense of original or first 
inhabitants,” and (4) “distinctive societies.”28 For Thornberry, these 
strands, which he calls the “Kennewick senses of indigenous,” are 
important touchstones in understanding what is indigenous.29 While he 
rejects the idea of a single, simple answer to the question of coherence in 
the category of indigenous peoples, he argues that all these Kennewick 
senses “are contained somewhere or other in the corpus of international 
law.”30 He also identifies a “spectrum of factors” employed in instruments 
and by commentators, “the ensemble of which is taken to portray the 
subject of their concern.”31 These factors include: “precedent habitation; 
historical continuity; attachment to land; the communal sense and the 
community right (including those societies which do not have a strong 
conception of individual rights); a cultural gap between the dominant 
groups in a State and the indigenous, and the colonial context[; and,] . . . 
self-identification as indigenous peoples.”32 
Thornberry invited comparison of his factors to those proposed by 
Daes in her 1995 report,33 and in many ways they are similar. But the 
factors differ, perhaps, in one key respect. While Daes referred to “the 
occupation and use of a specific territory,”34 Thornberry separately 
identifies the importance of “precedent habitation, historical continuity,” 
and “attachment to land.”35 In this sense, his factors reflect the claims of 
distinctive connection that became more prominent following the Daes 
Report. Indeed, in a subsequent working paper, Daes dealt specifically 
with “indigenous peoples and their relationship to land.”36 Thornberry also 
 
 
 26. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 36 (quoting Tony Allen-Mills, Ancient Bones Make White 
Mischief in U.S., THE SUNDAY TIMES, June 15, 1997, at 22) (internal quotations omitted). 
 27. Id. at 37. 
 28. Id. at 37–39 (emphasis omitted). 
 29. Id. at 51. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 55. 
 32. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 33. Id. at 55 n.170. 
 34. WGIP Report, supra note 18, ¶ 69. 
 35. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 55. 
 36. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Final Working Paper: 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities: Indigenous People 
and their Relationship to Land, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (June 11, 2001) (prepared by Erica-
Irene A. Daes). 
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compared his factors to those offered by Benedict Kingsbury in a piece 
that addressed the challenges of indigenous peoples in Asia.37 Kingsbury 
had divided his factors into “requirements” and “indicia” and included 
“affinity with . . . land” as a “[s]trong [i]ndicia” of indigenousness.38 
This Article does not depend on any one approach to defining 
“indigenous,” relying instead on the insights recounted above of those who 
have studied the question from an international human rights law 
perspective. It is important to note, however, that a unique relationship 
with the land is inherent in most of these understandings of what is 
indigenous. It is also a critical feature of many public statements by 
indigenous peoples and advocates.39 Thus, it should be seen not merely as 
a collateral feature of an indigenous lifestyle, but rather as a core element 
of indigenous identity. 
B. Of Discovery, Conquest, and Consent 
The treatment of indigenous peoples’ land rights—often the utter 
negation of those rights—was a defining feature of international law 
almost from the moment European powers first formally encountered the 
inhabitants of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Even at a time when the 
body of law we now consider “international” was largely prenatal, the 
disregard of non-European land rights by European political powers was 
palpable.  
The Papal Bull Inter Caetera, issued in 1493, is an early example.40 
Within a year of Columbus’ first voyage to the Western Hemisphere, the 
pope had taken special note of those “certain very remote islands and even 
mainlands that hitherto had not been discovered by others; wherein dwell 
very many peoples living in peace, and, as reported, going unclothed, and 
not eating flesh,”41 and proceeded to divide between the Kingdoms of 
Portugal and Spain all newly “discovered” territory occupied by these 
“many peoples.”42 This papal pronouncement regarded inhabitants in this 
territory as subjects for spiritual and moral conquest—issuing a 
 
 
 37. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 56. 
 38. Benedict Kingsbury, The Applicability of the International Legal Concept of “Indigenous 
Peoples” in Asia, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 336, 374 (Joanne R. Bauer & 
Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999).  
 39. See discussion infra Part III.F. 
 40. POPE ALEXANDER VI, THE BULL INTER CAETERA (May 4, 1493), translated in EUROPEAN 
TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES TO 1648 73, 75–
78 (Frances Gardiner Davenport ed., trans., 1917). 
 41. Id. at 76. 
 42. Id. at 76–78. 
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“command” that the king and queen of Spain43 “should appoint to the 
aforesaid mainlands and islands worthy, God-fearing, learned, skilled, and 
experienced men, in order to instruct the aforesaid inhabitants and 
residents in the Catholic faith and train them in good morals.”44 
The vigor with which the crown’s “worthy” men pursued the papal 
charge is a matter of record. Bartolomé de las Casas, an immigrant to 
Hispaniola (present-day Haiti and the Dominican Republic) in 1502 who 
later became a Dominican priest, reported at length on Spanish brutality 
toward their new “subjects” in the Caribbean and Central America, 
describing the extent to which the indigenous populations were 
dehumanized and dispossessed: 
The Spaniards have shown not the slightest consideration for these 
people, treating them (and I speak from first-hand experience, 
having been there from the outset) not as brute animals—indeed I 
would to God they had done and had shown them the consideration 
they afford their animals—so much as piles of dung in the middle of 
the road.45 
Las Casas noted the extent to which indigenous lands were seized and 
populations removed in a manner consistent with this low esteem. He 
reported that Hispaniola’s population had been reduced from “some three 
million” to only about two hundred and that half a million were forcibly 
moved from the Bahamas to Hispaniola to “make up losses among the 
indigenous population of that island.”46 
The reports of Las Casas are a rare first-hand written account of the 
European encounter, but history has revealed that indigenous populations 
throughout the Americas, as well as Africa and Asia, were held in similar 
regard by colonial powers.47 Indigenous lives, along with their interests in 
the land where they had lived, were disregarded and exploited. The nation-
states that emerged from this colonial period and inherited the territories 
thus acquired were occasionally called upon to justify their inheritance in 
 
 
 43. More precisely, “the illustrious sovereigns, our very dear son in Christ, Ferdinand, king, and 
our very dear daughter in Christ, Isabella, queen of Castile, Leon, Aragon, Sicily, and Granada” (now, 
with the exception of Sicily, parts of Spain). Id. at 75. 
 44. Id. at 77. 
 45. BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIES 13 
(Nigel Griffin ed., trans., 1992).  
 46. Id. at 11–12. 
 47. See, e.g., EDMUND D. MOREL, KING LEOPOLD’S RULE IN AFRICA 103 (1904) (describing the 
Belgian conquest of the Congo: “[t]he carnival of massacre, of which the Congo Territories have been 
the scene for the last twelve years, must appal (sic) all those who have studied the facts. From 1890 
onwards the records of the Congo State have been literally blood-soaked.”). 
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the face of claims about indigenous property rights. They employed either 
a doctrine of conquest or doctrine of discovery, which privileged a 
“discovering” European state over all other European states to claim 
sovereignty over new territories as though the land had been uninhabited 
at the time of European arrival.48 
This idea that the land in possession of indigenous peoples was like a 
blank slate was sometimes called terra nullius49 or vacuum domicilium.50 
In Emmerich de Vattel’s eighteenth century treatise The Law of Nations, 
the failure of indigenous peoples to “settle and cultivate” the land was 
offered as a justification for “tak[ing] possession of some part of a vast 
country, in which there are none but erratic nations whose scanty 
population is incapable of occupying the whole.”51 Vattel recognized an 
“oblig[ation] . . . to cultivate the land” which was “imposed by nature on 
mankind.”52 He reasoned this would prevent a European power from 
claiming lands that it could not fully occupy and exploit,53 arguing that 
this same principle should apply to indigenous populations whose: 
[U]nsettled habitation in those immense regions connot [sic] be 
accounted a true and legal possession; and the people of Europe, too 
closely pent up at home, finding land of which the savages stood in 
no particular need, and of which they made no actual and constant 
use, were lawfully entitled to take possession of it, and settle it with 
colonies.54 
Not all political theorists held that indigenous title was without any 
effect, though the entire discourse about indigenous property rights among 
European and colonial scholars during the fifteenth through nineteenth 
centuries seemed to begin with a fundamental negation of indigenous 
civilization. Mark F. Lindley published a treatise in 1926 classifying 
colonial period views on the legal status of indigenous lands (termed the 
 
 
 48. See, e.g., FRANKE WILMER, THE INDIGENOUS VOICE IN WORLD POLITICS: SINCE TIME 
IMMEMORIAL (1993). 
 49. See, e.g., SVEN LUNDQVIST, TERRA NULLIUS: A JOURNEY THROUGH NO ONE’S LAND (Sarah 
Death trans., 2007). 
 50. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, 
USE, AND CONSERVATION 4 (2005). 
 51. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 99–100 (Joseph Chitty ed., 
1863) (1758). 
 52. Id. at 35. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 100. 
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land of “backward races”).55 He grouped views into three categories: (I) 
those regarding indigenous title as good against more “civilized peoples,” 
(II) those regarding indigenous title to exist, but to be qualified, and (III) 
those believing indigenous rights are not of “such a nature” as to bar 
assumption of sovereignty by “more highly civilized peoples.”56 Thus, for 
some, lawful acquisition of indigenous lands required conquest or treaty, 
and for others a claim of discovery could be made despite prior habitation. 
For the latter group, Vattel’s natural law argument about the need to 
“make use of” the land seemed to resonate. “The earth,” he had reasoned, 
“belongs to mankind in general, and was designed to furnish them with 
subsistence.”57 Indigenous peoples, by virtue of their limited cultivation 
and use had created a vacuum sufficient to forfeit any claim to 
sovereignty. Vattel’s reasoning is echoed, for example, in a landmark case 
from the early nineteenth century United States, Johnson & Graham’s 
Lessee v. M’Intosh,58 where the U.S. Supreme Court faced competing 
property claims by one who held title acquired from the federal 
government and another who held title that traced to a direct private 
purchase from an indigenous tribe during the British colonial period. In 
rejecting the title of direct indigenous origin, the Court was forced to 
justify the extinguishment of indigenous land title by colonial occupation. 
The Court explained that “[i]n the establishment of these [colonial] 
relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, 
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, 
impaired.”59 
The Court in M’Intosh sought to defend the loss of indigenous title by 
the nature of indigenous land use. While seeming to reject Vattel’s 
premise and protesting that it would not “enter into the controversy, 
whether agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on 
abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to 
contract their limits[,]”60 the Court nevertheless reasoned: 
The tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, 
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn 
 
 
 55. M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–19 (1926); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 141 
(1894); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 18 COMMENTARIES *26–27. 
 56. LINDLEY, supra note 55. 
 57. VATTEL, supra note 51, at 100. 
 58. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 588. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] BEYOND INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS 67 
 
 
 
 
chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country 
was to leave the country a wilderness . . . . What was the inevitable 
consequence of this state of things? The Europeans were under the 
necessity either of abandoning the country, and relinquishing their 
pompous claims to it, or of enforcing those claims by the sword, 
and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition of a 
people with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be 
governed as a distinct society, or of remaining in their 
neighborhood, and exposing themselves and their families to the 
perpetual hazard of being massacred.61 
The M’Intosh Court appeared troubled by the “inevitable consequence” 
of its reasoning, but still seemed bound by the logic of these inherited 
colonial legal principles (and the fact that much of the United States was at 
the time either settled or being settled on the basis of these principles).62 
“However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an 
inhabited country into conquest may appear,” the Court seemed to lament, 
“if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards 
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property 
of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of 
the land, and cannot be questioned.”63 
In a far more recent case, the Australian High Court challenged the 
vitality of the terra nullius doctrine, at once rejecting it and embracing its 
consequences. In a 1992 decision, Mabo v. Queensland,64 the court 
explained: 
When . . . the Crown acquired sovereignty recognized by the 
European family of nations under the enlarged notion of terra 
nullius, it was necessary for the common law to prescribe a doctrine 
relating to the law to be applied in such colonies, for sovereignty 
imports supreme internal legal authority . . . . The view was taken 
that, when sovereignty of a territory could be acquired under the 
enlarged notion of terra nullius, for the purposes of the municipal 
law that territory (though inhabited) could be treated as a “desert 
uninhabited” country . . . . [T]he indigenous inhabitants of a settled 
 
 
 61. Id. at 590. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 591. 
 64. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. 
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colony had no recognized sovereign, else the territory could have 
been acquired only by conquest or cession.65 
The court linked the ability of European colonial powers to see 
indigenous lands as “vacant” to the comparative lack of social 
organization among indigenous communities: “As the indigenous 
inhabitants of a settled colony were regarded as ‘low in the scale of social 
organization’, they and their occupancy of colonial land were ignored in 
considering the title to land in a settled colony.”66 
The Mabo court found the terra nullius doctrine largely discredited, and 
held it could not be used to justify denial of indigenous land rights, yet the 
court stopped short of rejecting Australian sovereignty over the lands 
claimed under the doctrine.67 In a separate opinion, two justices explained 
that “communal native title” had “qualified and reduced” the “Crown’s 
ownership” of the lands in dispute, but acknowledged that the Crown 
retained sovereignty and that native title could be extinguished by 
legislative or executive act. 68 
While this seemingly inconsistent result can be criticized,69 one can see 
the Australian High Court struggling with the same challenge that 
confronted the U.S. Supreme Court more than a century before, and 
resolving the challenge in a related way. While Australia’s court sitting in 
the twentieth century could draw on a new understanding of indigenous 
rights, it still found itself a creature of a sovereign that could not, as a 
practical matter, challenge its master’s sovereignty. The court admitted as 
much when it cautioned: “[R]ecognition by our common law of the rights 
and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony 
would be precluded if the recognition were to fracture a skeletal principle 
of our legal system.”70 
Professor Thornberry notes that the doctrine of terra nullius was rarely 
exercised per se in the acquisition of inhabited lands and the idea that 
indigenous lands were akin to uninhabited territory “remained something 
 
 
 65. Id. ¶ 36. 
 66. Id. ¶ 39. This idea was not limited to Australia and the Americas, but also justified colonial 
expropriations elsewhere, including in Africa. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 
at 39 (Oct. 16) (“‘Occupation’ being legally an original means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over 
territory otherwise than by cession or succession, it was a cardinal condition of a valid ‘occupation’ 
that the territory should be terra nullius—a territory belonging to no-one—at the time of the act 
alleged to constitute the ‘occupation’.”). 
 67. See generally Mabo, 175 C.L.R. 
 68. Mabo, opinion of Deane and Gaudron, JJ., 175 C.L.R. ¶ 76(2). 
 69. See, e.g., Henry Reynolds, After Mabo, What About Aboriginal Sovereignty?, AUSTL. 
HUMAN. REV., Apr. 1996. 
 70. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. ¶ 43. 
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of an academic conceit.”71 He points out that in Africa, for example, land 
rights were more often subjects of “treaty races” where title “was 
generally based upon claims that it had been ceded by consent of African 
rulers, or, much less frequently, that it had been acquired by right of 
conquest.”72 This approach to acquisition, justified even by those theorists 
falling into Lindley’s category I (those who would recognize indigenous 
title as valid against “more civilized” peoples) remains difficult to defend 
in light of inequalities in power between the parties and very different 
cultural conceptions of land ownership and title.73 Thus, while the idea of 
consent was employed, it was not an idea that could bear much scrutiny. 
At bottom, whether through conquest, discovery, or consent, the results 
of what Thornberry calls “saltwater colonialism”74 were the same. 
Indigenous peoples were either extinguished, removed, or subordinated to 
new political powers with very different identities and approaches to land 
and resource development. 
C. An Emerging Claim of Indigenous Land Rights 
Even as domestic jurists in cases such as Mabo struggled to revisit 
doctrines of conquest and discovery while preserving their state’s 
sovereign prerogative, the international human rights discourse brought 
new support to indigenous claims of right including land rights. 
International law began moving from what Professor Anaya has called “a 
complicity with the often brutal forces that wrested lands from indigenous 
peoples”75 to embrace a normative construct with greater concern for 
individual and group rights. Instruments and institutions emerged that both 
“rehumanized” indigenous peoples and revisited claims about their 
sovereignty and land rights. 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) took a major step in 1957 
with approval of ILO Convention No. 107, which responded to studies and 
expert meetings on the vulnerability of indigenous workers and called for 
the “protection” and “progressive integration” of indigenous “into the life 
of their respective countries.”76 ILO No. 107 focused on members of 
 
 
 71. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 74–76. 
 72. Id. at 75–76 (quoting Hedley Bull, European States and African Political Commentaries, in 
THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 111 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984)). 
 73. See, e.g., RUSSELL SHORTO, ISLAND AT THE CENTER OF THE WORLD 79–90 (2004) (and 
citations therein); IAN BROWNLIE, TREATIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1992). 
 74. THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 48. 
 75. ANAYA, supra note 10, at 49. 
 76. International Labour Organization, Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, June 
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indigenous groups rather than groups themselves, and its emphasis on 
“progressive integration” seems at odds with a concern over cultural 
integrity.77 It does, however, recognize the “right of ownership, collective 
or individual, of the members of the populations concerned over the lands 
which these populations traditionally occupy,” place limits on removal 
from “habitual territories,” and call for respect of customary land tenure 
systems.78 Professor Anaya points out that the recognition of customary 
laws and collective ownership rights is “posited as transitory and hence 
overshadowed by a persistent deference and even preference for national 
programs of integration and noncoercive assimilation.”79 He also notes 
that there was “no apparent participation on the part of indigenous 
peoples’ own designated representatives” in the process of formulating the 
convention.80 
ILO No. 107 has been followed by ILO No. 169, adopted in 1989, 
which moves away from ILO No. 107’s assimilationist approach. ILO No. 
169 places greater emphasis on indigenous peoples and cultures, calling 
for “special measures” for “safeguarding the persons, institutions, 
property, labor, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned,”81 and 
makes clear that “[s]uch special measures shall not be contrary to the 
freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.”82 It also calls for states 
to respect the relationship indigenous peoples have with their “lands or 
territories” and to recognize “rights of ownership and possession” of 
traditionally occupied lands.83 
A number of other international and regional instruments, institutions, 
and tribunal decisions have emerged that similarly support claims to 
indigenous traditional lands and territories. This includes the creation of 
the WGIP; the appointment of Special Rapporteurs on Indigenous Rights; 
decisions of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) and Commission 
 
 
26, 1957, ILO No. 107, art. 2(1), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C107 
[hereinafter ILO No. 107]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. arts. 11, 12, 13. 
 79. ANAYA, supra note 10, at 55. 
 80. Id. at 54. 
 81. International Labour Organization, Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, Sept. 5, 1991, ILO No. 169, art. 4(1), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ 
cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169 [hereinafter ILO No. 169]. Although ILO No. 169 is considered a revision of 
ILO No. 107, and thus the prior convention is deemed outdated, there are eighteen countries that have 
ratified ILO No. 107 but not ILO No. 169. A total of nineteen countries have ratified ILO No. 169. See 
ILO Ratification Table, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 
2008). 
 82. ILO No. 169, supra note 81, art. 4(2).  
 83. Id. arts. 13, 14. 
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on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); decisions of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights; the formulation of World Bank Operational Policies; 
and most recently the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.84 They can collectively be seen as recognizing claims 
to land that were long denied in international law. As Professor Anaya 
notes, the activity that led to these and other measures “has involved, and 
substantially been driven by, indigenous peoples themselves.”85 His 
premise, that international law, “once an instrument of colonialism, has 
developed and continues to develop, however grudgingly or imperfectly, 
to support indigenous peoples’ demands,”86 is difficult to challenge. In the 
area of land rights, however, the imperfections remain somewhat glaring 
and also perhaps inevitable. There remains a dichotomy between title and 
sovereignty that is a legacy of earlier doctrines of conquest and discovery. 
Having once denied sovereignty, title, and often personhood to indigenous 
peoples, it is a difficult project to recognize collective indigenous title 
(which has implications for tenurial relationships and development 
decisions) while allowing a surrounding state to retain ultimate 
sovereignty. It is a conflict at the heart of decisions such as M’Intosh and 
Mabo, and one that remains difficult to reconcile. The recognition of the 
distinctive relationship indigenous peoples have to the land may be one 
key to such a reconciliation. 
III. ASSERTING A DISTINCTIVE CONNECTION TO THE LAND 
The emergence of indigenous peoples’ land rights in international law 
has been closely tied to the recognition that indigenous peoples have a 
distinctive social, cultural, and spiritual relationship with traditional lands 
and natural resources. This is evident in instruments such as the 2007 U.N. 
Declaration on Indigenous Rights, in institutional guidelines such as the 
World Bank’s operational policies, and in claims made by indigenous 
peoples and their advocates. 
 
 
 84. See discussion infra Part III. These measures are discussed in detail in the following two 
Parts of this Article, with a specific focus on terms that deal with indigenous land rights and the 
distinctive connection that indigenous peoples are understood to have with the land. 
 85. ANAYA, supra note 10, at 56. 
 86. Id. at 4. 
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A. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
The most recent instrument to acknowledge this relationship is the 
2007 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.87 The 
declaration links colonization and dispossession to concerns over self-
determination and cultural traditions in a way that obliquely, yet 
affirmatively, ties the loss of land to the loss of cultural rights. The 
preamble, for example, expresses concern over “colonization and 
dispossession of [indigenous] lands, territories and resources,” and claims 
that “control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and 
their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and 
strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions.”88 One might argue 
that this claim is not unique to indigenous peoples: territorial control by 
any population will enable institutions, cultures, and traditions. But the 
language in context ties indigenous institutions, culture, and tradition to 
the land in a way that is unique. The “inherent rights of indigenous 
peoples” to their “lands, territories, and resources,” the preamble tells us, 
“derive from” indigenous “cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and 
philosophies.”89 Thus land rights are not incidental to culture, but integral 
to identity. 
This claim is qualitatively different from human rights doctrine relating 
to non-indigenous property rights, which are understood as a universal 
right untethered to the cultures, spiritual traditions, histories or 
philosophies of claimants. Here, though, the declaration explicitly 
embraces a “land-identity uniqueness” claim: “Indigenous peoples have 
the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship 
with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, 
territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their 
responsibilities to future generations in this regard.”90 
The declaration further upholds the right to traditional medicines and 
health practices, “including the conservation of their vital medicinal 
plants, animals and minerals”;91 highlighting resources with cultural as 
well as medicinal value. Article 26 calls for “legal recognition and 
protection” of traditional “lands, territories and resources. . . . with due 
respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the 
 
 
 87. 2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note 4. 
 88. Id. pmbl. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. art. 25. 
 91. Id. art. 24. 
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indigenous peoples concerned,”92 thus addressing questions of traditional 
tenure that historically led to the dispossession of indigenous peoples.93 
The declaration also confirms specific environmental and conservation 
rights of indigenous peoples.94 This includes full, prior, and informed 
participation in decisions relating to lands, territories, and resources, 
“particularly in connection with the development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources,”95 as well as prohibitions 
on hazardous material storage or disposal and military activities.96 It also 
confirms the right of indigenous peoples “to determine and develop 
priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or 
territories and other resources,”97 and requires effective mechanisms “to 
mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual 
impact” of development and land use.98 Thus, in addition to claiming that 
indigenous peoples have a distinctive connection to their lands, the 
declaration makes guarantees consistent with this connection and at many 
points directly implies that environmental impact may also imply cultural 
or spiritual impact. 
B. The International Labour Organization 
ILO No. 169 likewise recognizes the unique relationship of indigenous 
communities99 to land, stating that “governments shall respect the special 
importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned 
of their relationship with the lands or territories . . . and in particular the 
collective aspects of this relationship.”100 It also calls for special measures 
to safeguard “the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and 
 
 
 92. Id. art. 26(3). 
 93. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 94. See, e.g., 2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note 4, arts. 29–32. 
 95. Id. art. 32. 
 96. Id. arts. 29, 30. 
 97. Id. art. 32. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Note the implicit definition of indigenous peoples in ILO No. 169, stating the convention 
applies to “[t]ribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions 
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly 
or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations.” ILO No. 169, supra 
note 81, art. 1(a). It also emphasizes, as have other efforts to define, “[s]elf-identification as 
indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion.” Id. art. 1(2). 
 100. Id. art. 13. 
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environment” of indigenous peoples,101 including punishment for 
trespass.102  
The convention calls for the participation of indigenous peoples in 
deciding “their own priorities for the process of development as it affects 
their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they 
occupy or otherwise use . . . .”103 It also provides that development 
activities be preceded by assessment of “social, spiritual, cultural and 
environmental impact,”104 and calls for mitigation “in co-operation with 
the peoples concerned, to protect and preserve the environment of the 
territories they inhabit.”105 Thus, as the 2007 U.N. Declaration, ILO No. 
169 directly acknowledges a unique relationship to the land, and explicitly 
links “social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impacts.”106 
C. Regional Human Rights Instruments 
The proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples107 likewise recognizes “the respect for the environment accorded 
by the cultures of indigenous peoples of the Americas,” and “the special 
relationship between the indigenous peoples and the environment, lands, 
resources and territories on which they live”;108 combining the idea of a 
unique connection to the land with a claim regarding indigenous peoples 
as environmental stewards. It also claims “in many indigenous cultures, 
traditional collective systems for control and use of land, territory, and 
resources, including bodies of water and coastal areas, are a necessary 
condition for their survival, social organization, development and their 
 
 
 101. Id. art. 4. 
 102. Id. art. 18. The convention provides: “Adequate penalties shall be established by law for 
unauthorised intrusion upon, or use of, the lands of the peoples concerned, and governments shall take 
measures to prevent such offences.” Id. 
 103. ILO No. 169, supra note 81, art. 7(1). The ILO notes that committees established to examine 
representations brought against states under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution have repeatedly dealt 
with the Article 17 duty of consultation prior to the exploration or exploitation of natural resources on 
the lands they occupy or use. See International Labour Organization, Standards and Supervision: Main 
Situations Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples which ILO Supervision Has Dealt With (on file 
with author), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/french/indigenous/standard/super1.htm (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2007). 
 104. ILO No. 169, supra note 81, art. 7(3). 
 105. Id. art. 7(4). 
 106. Id. 
 107. American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95, doc.6 (draft approved Feb. 26, 1997) [hereinafter American Declaration]. 
 108. Id. pmbl., ¶ 3; see also Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, doc. 10 rev. (Apr. 24, 1997). 
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individual and collective well-being . . . .”109 It would require measures to 
protect “sacred sites”110 and affirm an indigenous “right to the protection 
of vital medicinal plants, animals, and minerals in their traditional 
territories.”111 
The proposed American Declaration features extensive provisions on 
the “right to environmental protection,”112 including a claim that 
“indigenous peoples have the right to a safe and healthy environment, 
which is an essential condition for the enjoyment of the right to life and 
collective well-being.”113 This language suggests that indigenous 
environmental rights might be both civil and political (relating to life) and 
economic, social, and cultural rights (collective well-being). While these 
rights should be understood as universal and indivisible, they are often 
classified and addressed separately.114  
The American Declaration would provide for early, informed, and 
active indigenous participation in environmental and land use matters 
affecting their lands,115 and require that states respond to and punish 
environmental harms affecting indigenous peoples.116 It also explicitly 
advances an indigenous “right to conserve, restore and protect their 
environment and the productive capacity of their lands, territories and 
resources.”117 This includes a “right to assistance from their states” and 
from international organizations “for purposes of environmental 
protection.”118 This language is interesting both in its implicit 
acknowledgement of state sovereignty over indigenous lands and in its 
approval of arrangements whereby indigenous peoples may receive direct 
international assistance from institutions such as World Bank and others 
that might otherwise require state permission before funding projects 
within national territories. 
The American Declaration would protect “traditional forms of property 
ownership” linked explicitly with “cultural survival.”119 It also includes 
provisions comparable to the 2007 U.N. Declaration regarding alienability 
 
 
 109. American Declaration, supra note 107, pmbl., ¶ 5. 
 110. Id. art. X, ¶ 3. 
 111. Id. art. XII, ¶ 2. 
 112. Id. art. XIII. 
 113. Id. art. XIII, ¶ 1. 
 114. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, 
POLITICS, MORALS 237–38 (2d ed. 2000). 
 115. American Declaration, supra note 107, art. XIII, ¶¶ 2, 4, 7. 
 116. Id. art. XIII, ¶ 6. 
 117. Id. art. XIII, ¶ 3.  
 118. Id. art. XIII, ¶ 5. 
 119. Id. art. XVIII. 
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of lands and property rights from indigenous to non-indigenous peoples, 
although the language differs in important respects. The American 
Declaration would “recognize the [land] titles of indigenous peoples . . . as 
permanent, exclusive, inalienable, imprescriptible and indefeasible,”120 
and provides that “titles may be changed only by mutual consent between 
the state and the respective indigenous peoples.”121 In contrast, the 2007 
U.N. Convention provides for consultation,122 but would not appear to 
require mutual consent. One might argue that the American Declaration 
thus represents a different view about underlying indigenous sovereignty, 
but both approaches still constrain an indigenous community wishing to 
act on its own, and in this regard both are freighted with ideas of state 
sovereignty (if not paternalism). 
Whatever message the American Declaration may send regarding 
continuing state sovereignty over indigenous lands, it settles the question 
of usufructuary rights decidedly in favor of indigenous peoples who, it 
provides,  
have the right to an effective legal framework for the protection of 
their rights with respect to the natural resources on their lands, 
including the ability to use, manage, and conserve such resources, 
and with respect to traditional uses of their lands, interest in lands, 
and resources, such as subsistence.123 
Where the state retains subsurface rights (not uncommon in the 
Americas), the American Declaration would require prior participation in 
decisions about impact on the “interests” of indigenous peoples, and 
participation in the “benefits of such activities,” including compensation 
for any negative impact.124 The proposed American Declaration also 
requires prior informed consent and compensation where expropriation is 
contemplated.125 It would also require states to “take all measures . . . to 
avert, prevent and punish” trespass.126 
Regional human rights instruments in Africa and Europe do not address 
the concerns of indigenous peoples in the same manner as in the inter-
 
 
 120. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 3(i). 
 121. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 3(ii). It is worth noting that the declaration would explicitly reserve the right 
of indigenous communities to make decisions about the allocation of ownership within the community 
“in accordance with their customs, traditions, uses and traditional practices.” Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 3(iii). 
 122. 2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note 4, art. 17, ¶ 2. 
 123. American Declaration, supra note 107, art. XVIII, ¶ 4. 
 124. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 5. 
 125. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 6. 
 126. Id. art. XVIII, ¶ 8. 
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American system.127 Property rights provisions do not deal explicitly with 
indigenous lands, nor make an explicit link between indigenous peoples 
and their cultural or spiritual regard for the land. Some property rights 
provisions could be used to advance the concerns of indigenous 
communities, such as the Banjul Charter’s declarations that “the right to 
property . . . may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or 
in the general interest of the community,”128 and that “all peoples shall 
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources,” a right to be 
“exercised in the exclusive interest of the people.”129 These provisions 
place the “community” or “people’s” interest at the center of decisions 
about property in a way that might advance indigenous community 
interests without making explicit reference to indigenous status or a 
unique connection to the land. The Banjul Charter also declares that “[a]ll 
peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural 
development with due regard to their freedom and identity . . . .”130 Again, 
this provision makes no reference to indigenous peoples or land 
connectedness. It could, however, provide a basis for advancing the kind 
of land rights indigenous communities seek, by explicitly tying economic 
with social and cultural development in a single phrase that also calls for 
due regard to identity. 
Environmental provisions of the Banjul Charter likewise make no 
separate reference to indigenous peoples, but instead provide that “[a]ll 
peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable 
to their development.”131 Coupled with the provisions just examined 
calling for the protection of economic and cultural rights, an argument 
could be constructed for the protection of traditional communities that 
might fit into a broader understanding of the term indigenous. The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) used these 
provisions in tandem to protect the Ogoni people from the impact of oil 
drilling operations of the state oil company in consortium with Shell 
Petroleum Development Corporation. In Social and Economic Rights 
 
 
 127. This article deals only with inter-American, African, and European regional instruments 
because other regional instruments have not yet progressed beyond drafts and discussions, although 
the proposed Asian Human Rights Charter does include the section “Indigenous/Tribal/Peoples’ 
Rights.” See Asian Human Rights Commission, Asian Human Rights Charter, available at 
http://material.ahrchk.net/charter/mainfile.php/draft_charter/ (last visited July 5, 2007). 
 128. Organization of African Unity, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 14, June 
27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter Banjul Charter]. The Banjul Charter is the core African Human 
Rights instrument, sometimes referred to as the African Charter rather than the Banjul Charter. 
 129. Id. art. 21. 
 130. Id. art. 22, ¶ 1. 
 131. Id. art. 24. 
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Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria 
(SERAC),132 the ACHPR cited the Banjul Charter’s Article 24 
environmental provisions and Article 21 provisions on wealth, natural 
resources, and economic exploitation (along with human health 
provisions) to find that Nigeria and Shell had violated the rights of the 
Ogoni.133 The ACHPR rebuked the government’s failure to engage the 
Ogoni people in development decisions affecting their lands. “In all their 
dealings with the Oil Consortiums,” the ACHPR found, “the government 
did not involve the Ogoni Communities in the decisions that affected the 
development of Ogoniland.”134 The ACHPR placed the origins of the 
Banjul Charter’s Article 21 provisions on wealth, natural resources, and 
economic exploitation in a context with strong parallels to the history of 
colonial encounters with indigenous peoples in other regions: 
The origin of this provision may be traced to colonialism, during 
which the human and material resources of Africa were largely 
exploited for the benefit of outside powers, creating tragedy for 
Africans themselves, depriving them of their birthright and 
alienating them from the land. The aftermath of colonial 
exploitation has left Africa’s precious resources and people still 
vulnerable to foreign misappropriation.135 
Thus, despite the unique history and contemporary political structures 
that distinguish Africa, one can see in the region’s provisions dealing with 
land and resource rights clear traces of the “saltwater colonialism” that 
Thornberry notes is common to the indigenous experience.136 Missing is 
an explicit claim about an indigenous identity linked to the land in a 
spiritual or cultural sense, although the ACHPR’s concern with preserving 
the African birthright and “alienation” from the land and its willingness to 
use the Banjul Charter’s broader provisions on natural resources to protect 
the Ogoni people suggest at least an implicit acknowledgement of some 
special connectedness. 
 
 
 132. Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. & the Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, Afr. 
Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001). 
 133. Id. ¶ 58 (findings regarding Article 21 violations) and ¶ 54 (findings regarding Article 24 
violations). 
 134. Id. ¶ 55. 
 135. Id. ¶ 56. 
 136. See THORNBERRY, supra note 24, at 48. 
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D. Other International Instruments 
In 1992, government leaders from 172 countries met at the U.N. 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)137 and adopted 
an action plan addressing a range of environmental and natural resources 
challenges within a framework of sustainable and equitable development. 
That action plan, Agenda 21, recognized that “[i]ndigenous people and 
their communities have an historical relationship with their lands and are 
generally descendants of the original inhabitants of such lands.”138 The 
term “lands” was “understood to include the environment of the areas 
which the people concerned traditionally occupy,”139 and Agenda 21 
acknowledged that indigenous peoples and their communities “have 
developed over many generations a holistic traditional scientific 
knowledge of their lands, natural resources and environment.”140 Agenda 
21 also stressed that the cultural and physical well-being of indigenous 
peoples are linked to the land and its development, providing: 
In view of the interrelationship between the natural environment 
and its sustainable development and the cultural, social, economic 
and physical well-being of indigenous people, national and 
international efforts to implement environmentally sound and 
sustainable development should recognize, accommodate, promote 
and strengthen the role of indigenous people and their 
communities.141 
Agenda 21 called for protection of indigenous peoples from 
environmentally unsound activities as well as those “the indigenous people 
concerned consider to be socially and culturally inappropriate.”142 This 
provision acknowledges not only that activities affecting the environment 
may be particularly inappropriate from an indigenous perspective, but also 
that the determination of sociocultural appropriateness should be left to 
“the indigenous people concerned.” Such an approach is consistent with 
areas of law that protect spiritual and religious rights without imposing 
 
 
 137. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (1992), www.un.org/geninfo/bp/ 
enviro.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). UNCED was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and is sometimes 
referred to as the “Rio Conference.” 
 138. U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. of Sustainable Dev., Agenda 21, ¶ 26.1, 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm [hereinafter 
Agenda 21]. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. ¶ 26.3(a)(ii). 
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outside definitions or interpretations on those who would exercise them. It 
admits both a respect for the indigenous-environment relationship and an 
unwillingness to constrain that relationship through a meaning imposed by 
dominant cultures or through some universal definition.  
Agenda 21 also recognizes “that traditional and direct dependence on 
renewable resources and ecosystems, including sustainable harvesting, 
continues to be essential to the cultural, economic and physical well-being 
of indigenous people and their communities.”143 This provision is 
important not only because it reasserts a concern with indigenous cultural 
and physical well-being tied to the environment,144 but also because it 
employs the idea of dependence on ecosystems as well as resources. 
Ecosystem dependence is far deeper and more integral than a dependence 
on any one natural resource or feature because it contemplates dependence 
on the entire system, including biological, chemical, and physical 
elements, and their interaction with one another.145 Participants in UNCED 
certainly understood the significance of this distinction, and if applied in 
its most appropriate and robust meaning, it would offer a measure of 
protection for claims to traditional lands which have unique ecosystems 
that cannot be seen as fungible. More important with respect to complex 
systemic environmental claims (such as climate change), a recognition that 
indigenous peoples’ rights include ecosystem integrity could be seen to 
protect elements of the natural environment (such as weather patterns and 
nutrient cycles) that may directly affect a subsistence resource (such as 
water or fish stocks) or at least influence the long term availability or 
health of that resource. 
The UNCED conference also hosted the signing of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD),146 which recognized “the close and traditional 
dependence of many indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles on biological resources.”147 The CBD recognizes both 
a benefit to indigenous communities in the conservation of biological 
resources and also a benefit to the broader society in “sharing equitably 
 
 
 143. Id. ¶ 26.3(a)(iv). 
 144. The concern with physical well-being is common to both paragraphs 26.1 and 26.3. 
 145. An “ecosystem” is understood as a “[c]ommunity of organisms interacting with one another 
and with the chemical and physical factors making up their environment.” G. TYLER MILLER, JR., 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: SUSTAINING THE EARTH A7 (1991). The chemical and physical factors 
include sunlight, rainfall, soil nutrients, climate, salinity, etc. See M. Lynne Corn, Ecosystems, Biomes, 
and Watersheds: Definitions and Use, Cong. Research Serv. Rep., 103d Cong. (July 14, 1993), 
available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-70:1.  
 146. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1993 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter CBD]. 
 147. Id. pmbl. 
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benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and the 
sustainable use of its components.”148 In this sense, it offers an argument 
of instrumental value to non-indigenous communities not typically 
advanced in the context of indigenous rights. Those rights are often 
expressed in terms of their importance to indigenous peoples and the 
moral obligation of non-indigenous populations,149 but the CBD was clear 
that social and economic advantages flow to non-indigenous societies, 
who enjoy the benefits of traditional knowledge and practices150—
recognizing, for example, the value of “indigenous and traditional 
knowledge” relating to biological diversity.151 
E. Institutional Treatment—The World Bank’s Operational Policies 
The World Bank developed an internal policy on “tribal peoples” in 
1981, in response to protests over the impact of a bank-financed 
hydroelectric project in the Philippines’ Chico River Basin.152 The bank 
later issued a revised “indigenous peoples” policy in 1994, following 
criticism of the 1981 policy; yet despite progress, the updated approach 
was also criticized, and, in the late 1990s, the bank looked again at 
indigenous concerns.153 This time the bank drew, in part, on the input of 
indigenous advocates. The result, Operational Policy (OP) 4.10, issued in 
2005, was cautiously welcomed by indigenous advocates such as the 
Indian Law Resource Center (ILRC) as a “significant advance” over 
earlier bank efforts.154 Despite concern over “serious shortcomings,” ILRC 
approved of prior informed consultation requirements in OP 4.10, and 
 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. See, e.g., 2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note 4 art. 25 (speaking in terms of a “spiritual 
relationship” and “responsibilities to future generations”). 
 150. CBD, supra note 146, ¶ 8(j). 
 151. Id. ¶ 17(2). 
 152. Andrew Gray, Development Policy, Development Protest: The World Bank, Indigenous 
Peoples, and NGOs, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND 
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 267, 269–70 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998); see also 
Kay Treakle, NACLA Report on the Americas, The World Bank’s Indigenous Policy (Apr. 18, 1996), 
available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/25/022.html; Indian L. Resource Ctr., The World 
Bank’s Indigenous Peoples’ Policy: Successes and Setbacks (Oct. 2005) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter ILRC White Paper]. 
 153. On criticism of updated policy, see Gray, supra note 152; Treakle, supra note 152. On the 
review process, see Summary of Consultations with External Stakeholders regarding the World Bank 
Draft Indigenous Peoples Policy, World Bank White Paper, Apr. 18, 2002 (on file with author). 
 154. ILRC White Paper, supra note 152. 
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noted that “unlike the 1991 policy, OP 4.10 recognizes some of the special 
concerns raised by conservation areas and extractive industries.”155  
The new policy recognizes the distinctive connection of indigenous 
peoples to the land, providing: 
The Bank recognizes that the identities and cultures of Indigenous 
Peoples are inextricably linked to the lands on which they live and 
the natural resources on which they depend. These distinct 
circumstances expose Indigenous Peoples to different types of risks 
and levels of impacts from development projects, including loss of 
identity, culture, and customary livelihoods, as well as exposure to 
disease.156 
OP 4.10 recognizes that “Indigenous Peoples are closely tied to land, 
forests, water, wildlife, and other natural resources, and therefore special 
considerations apply if the project affects such ties.”157 In these cases, 
planning documents must “pay particular attention to” the “customary 
rights of the Indigenous Peoples, both individual and collective, pertaining 
to lands or territories that they traditionally owned, or customarily used or 
occupied, and where access to natural resources is vital to the 
sustainability of their cultures and livelihoods.”158 Special considerations 
also include “the cultural and spiritual values that the Indigenous Peoples 
attribute to such lands and resources”159 as well as “Indigenous Peoples’ 
natural resources management practices and the long-term sustainability of 
such practices.”160 
OP 4.10 also requires an action plan for legal recognition of traditional 
ownership, occupation, or usage for projects involving land titling and 
acquisition—calling for “full legal recognition of existing customary land 
tenure systems of Indigenous Peoples[,] or conversion of customary usage 
rights to communal and/or individual ownership rights.”161 If neither 
option is possible under domestic law, the plan should include “measures 
for legal recognition of perpetual or long-term renewable custodial or use 
rights.”162 
 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policies: Indigenous Peoples, OP 4.10, ¶ 2 
(2005). 
 157. Id. ¶ 16. 
 158. Id. ¶ 16(a). 
 159. Id. ¶ 16(c). 
 160. Id. ¶ 16(d). 
 161. Id. ¶ 17. 
 162. Id. 
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Where a bank project involves commercial development of natural 
resources on indigenous lands, OP 4.10 calls for “a free, prior, and 
informed consultation process,” which includes information on the 
“potential effects of such development on the Indigenous Peoples’ 
livelihoods, environments, and use of such resources.”163 Project 
proponents must also provide information on “the potential effects of such 
development on Indigenous Peoples’ livelihoods, environments, and use 
of such resources,” where a project involves “the commercial development 
of Indigenous Peoples’ cultural resources and knowledge (for example, 
pharmacological or artistic).”164 
OP 4.10 recognizes that the “physical relocation of Indigenous Peoples 
is particularly complex and may have significant adverse impacts on their 
identity, culture, and customary livelihoods”165 and thus discourages 
relocation except “in exceptional circumstances,” requiring borrowers “to 
explore alternative project designs to avoid physical relocation of 
Indigenous Peoples.”166 Where relocation is unavoidable, OP 4.10 requires 
borrowers to seek “broad support for it from the affected Indigenous 
Peoples’ communities as part of the free, prior, and informed consultation 
process.”167 It also requires a resettlement plan “compatible with the 
Indigenous Peoples’ cultural preferences, and includes a land-based 
resettlement strategy.”168 
While the World Bank has been widely criticized for the effect of its 
lending policies169 (particularly those that affect the environment and the 
 
 
 163. Id. ¶ 18. 
 164. Id. ¶ 19. 
 165. Id. ¶ 20. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See, e.g., FIFTY YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994). Two leading examples of 
organizations that work through networks formed in large part to monitor and challenge World Bank 
lending practices are the Bank Information Center (BIC), whose web site at www.bicusa.org includes 
press releases, white papers, and links documenting dozens of challenges to World Bank practices by 
dozens of organizations, and 50 Years is Enough, whose web site at www.50years.org includes a 
similar record of concern over World Bank Practices. See, e.g., Radhika Sarin et al., Earthworks, 
Tarnished Gold: Mining and the Unmet Promise of Development (Sept. 2006), available at 
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Page.Publications.aspx (last visited June 10, 2008); Bank Information Center 
et al., How the World Bank’s Energy Framework Sells the Climate and Poor People Short, (Sept. 
2006), available at http://www.bicusa.org/en/Page.Publications.aspx (last visited June 10, 2008); Press 
Release, Gender Action, 50 Years Is Enough & CEE Bankwatch, IMF and World Bank Policies 
Promote Violence Against Women, (Mar. 7, 2007), available at http://www.50years.org/cms/updates/ 
story/381 (last visited June 10, 2008). World Bank has established an internal review mechanism, the 
World Bank Inspection Panel, which receives complaints about lending practices and allegations that 
the bank has failed to follow its own internal practices. The Inspection Panel’s web site, hosted at 
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rights of indigenous peoples170), OP 4.10 can be seen as a positive step, at 
least in its formal recognition of the relationship between indigenous 
peoples and the environment—a relationship tied to indigenous identity 
and culture as well as economic livelihood. The Operational Policy 
followed the findings of a senior sociologist in the Bank’s Environment 
Department by more than a decade. These findings were published in 1993 
as a World Bank discussion paper entitled Indigenous Views of Land and 
the Environment, which calls for attention to the unique connection of 
indigenous communities to the environment.171 OP 4.10 can be seen as an 
important, though belated, recognition of this connection. At least the bank 
is a step ahead of many other economic development institutions with a 
profound influence on public development policy that have not made this 
link.172 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), for example, does not even mention indigenous peoples in its 
“Guidance” document on “Strategies for Sustainable Development.”173 
F. Indigenous Peoples’ Voices 
The distinctive connection of indigenous peoples to the land has social, 
cultural, and spiritual dimensions that have not always translated well into 
law—even human rights law, despite its explicit regard for social and 
cultural concerns. This inevitable loss in translation found expression, in 
part, in the ignorance that characterized colonial era legal claims about 
 
 
www.worldbank.org, documents multiple complaints by multiple different actors. 
 170.  See, e.g., BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH: THE WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPOVERISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT 283–93 (1994); Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F. 
Kormos, Environmental Reform at the World Bank: The Role of the U.S. Congress, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 
777, 786–88 (1995); Andrew Gray, Development Policy-Development Protest: The World Bank, 
Indigenous Peoples and NGOs, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 
NGOS AND THE WORLD BANK (Jonathan Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1996); Bank Information 
Center, Rebuked by Internal Investigation, World Bank Plans to do More in DRC Forest Sector, but 
Will it do Better? (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3645.aspx (concerning 
the bank’s failure to take account of forest sector financing on forest Pygmies in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo). Compare David B. Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of 
Environmental Standards at International Financial Institutions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 437 (2008) 
(describing evolving and improving environmental standards at World Bank in response to criticism). 
 171. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPER 188, INDIGENOUS VIEWS OF LAND AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT (Shelton Davis ed., 1993). 
 172. For a detailed discussion of OP 4.10 and the bank’s underlying obligations to recognize 
indigenous rights, see Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe Unto Itself? Indigenous 
Peoples’ Human Rights and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, 
17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 527 (2002). 
 173. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Strategies for Sustainable 
Development: Guidance for Development Co-operation (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/34/10/2669958.pdf. 
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how indigenous peoples were using (or not using) the land.174 
Justifications based on ideas such as terra nullius, or the bias against 
cultures that failed to cultivate, so evident in opinions such as M’Intosh—
even the willingness to morally and theoretically ratify treaties by which 
vast lands were “sold” by indigenous peoples to colonial powers—spring 
in part from sociocultural and spiritual differences that made indigenous 
perspectives on the land difficult for colonial cultures to understand 
(although one cannot discount the influence of avarice and acquisitiveness 
even where hints of cultural awareness were present). 
Without yielding to the conceit that a full understanding of these 
cultural and spiritual differences in a universal legal framework is 
possible, and recognizing that modern expressions of indigenous beliefs, 
including beliefs about a distinctive connection to the land, are filtered 
through the legacy of colonial conquest and the exigencies of international 
legal discourse, it is nevertheless important to ask how the connection is 
described in indigenous terms by indigenous peoples. An effort has thus 
been made in preparing this Article to gather indigenous expressions of 
land, natural resource, and environmental connectedness through public 
sources (such as statements and publications of indigenous groups and 
advocates) and through academic literature (principally from anthropology 
and sociology).175 
The author collected more than fifty statements of indigenous groups or 
advocates, mostly available from public sources, which speak of and about 
indigenous connectedness to the land, resources, and environment.176 
Despite the caveats inherent in relying on such a collection—and 
recognizing that they are a very small publicly available sample of voices 
from a highly diverse groups of people numbering over 200 million—they 
affirm, in sum, the trend in legal instruments and institutions toward 
recognizing a distinctive connection. The land as sometimes described as 
an economic provider (a “pantry,” according to “the NI ‘aka’ pamux 
people”177), which is understandable enough in western legal terms, and 
 
 
 174. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 175. This methodology is highly constraining and in many ways problematic, but it is not 
presented as an empirical data set, or even a sampling of authentic or representative voices. Instead, it 
is a picture of the claims made publicly (or in some cases to interviewers) by indigenous peoples 
(individuals, groups, and organizations) and indigenous advocates. In the context of this Article, it is 
thought that the limitations and biases inherent in such an approach are outweighed by the advantage 
of seeing at least some of the claims made by indigenous peoples regarding the land in their own 
voices. 
 176. The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance in this endeavor from Mellisa 
Benitez-Cotera and Maria E. Brockmann Rojas. 
 177. Marcus Colchester, Beyond “Participation”: Indigenous Peoples, Biological Diversity 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:53 
 
 
 
 
also as mother (the Huitchol;178 the Wayuu;179 the Cree180), as sacred (the 
Suquamish;181 the Mapuche;182 the U’wa;183 the Quechua184), and as an 
object of adoration (the Sami).185  
The vast majority of statements collected—over ninety-five percent—
refer to a value that can be characterized as “spiritual.” They refer to the 
spiritual value of some geographic feature (such as a mountain, lake, or 
stream) and the spiritual value of a specific species (such as a type of tree, 
bird, or fish). Examples include the Quechua in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru 
(“Divinity . . . in nature is represented by the mountain,”)186 and the 
Chobar and Lalitpur of Nepal (the “Gangaji has power . . . water and sand 
from this river is required while performing a weekly religious ritual [and] 
annual rites for the dead.”).187 For the Maori of New Zealand, “the land is 
 
 
Conservation and Protected Area Management, 47 UNASYLVA, No. 186 (1996) (quoting Ruby Dustan 
from Stein Valley, Alberta, Canada). 
 178. Guillermo De la Pena, Social Citizenship, Ethnic Minority Demands, Human Rights and 
Neoliberal Paradoxes: A Case Study in Western Mexico, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: 
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY 129 (Rachel Sieder ed., 2002) (quoting Mauricio, 
a Huitchol Elder). 
 179. Bjorn Sletto, Mapping the Gran Sabana, AMERICAS MAGAZINE, NOV. 2005, at 6, 13 (quoting 
Noeli Pocaterra, President of the Commission for Indigenous People and Vice-President of the 
National Assembly). 
 180. Danny Beaton, Healing and Protecting Our Sacred Mother Earth, FIRST NATIONS DRUM, 
Summer 2002, available at http://www.firstnationsdrum.com/Sum2002/CovHealingProtecting.htm 
(quoting Annie Mouse). 
 181. The First Nations Environmental Network, http://www.fnen.org/?q=node/35 (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2008) (quoting Chief Seattle); see also Henry A. Smith, Chief Seattle’s 1854 Oration, 
SEATTLE SUNDAY STAR, Oct. 29, 1887, available at www.halcyon.com/arborhts/chiefsea.html; 
ALBERT FURTWANGLER, ANSWERING CHIEF SEATTLE 12–17 (1997). Seattle was of both Suquamish 
(paternal) and Duwamish (maternal) descent. Id. at 144. See also CARL WALDMAN, ATLAS OF THE 
NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 157 (2000). 
 182. ANA MARIELLA BACIGALUPO, SHAMANS OF THE FOYE TREE; GENDER, POWER AND 
HEALING AMONG CHILEAN MAPUCHE 48–49 (2007). 
 183. Larry Mosqueda, The Struggle of the Indigenous U’wa People against Oil Exploitation and 
for Life: Green Action in Columbia, SYNTHESIS/REGENERATION, Winter 2002, available at 
http://www.greens.org/s-r/27/27-26.html; see also Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Hybrid State—
Corporate Enterprise and Violations of Indigenous Land Rights: Theorizing Corporate Responsibility 
and Accountability Under International Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 135, 136 (2007). 
 184. Shanna Langdon, Peru’s Yanacocha Gold Mine: The IFC’s Midas Touch?, CIEL, Sept. 
2000, available at http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/ifccaseperu.html; see also GARCILASO DE LA VEGA, ROYAL 
COMMENTARIES OF THE INCAS AND GENERAL HISTORY OF PERU 32 (Harold Livermore, trans., 1966). 
 185. Elizabeth Ann Svec, Metaphor and Metaphysics within Sami Culture, http://www. 
utexas.edu/courses/sami/dieda/anthro/meta.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2008); see also Emily Barclay, 
The Sámi Traditional World View through Decline and Ascent, http://www.utexas.edu/courses/sami/ 
dieda/anthro/worldview.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 186. Evaristo Pfuture Consa, La Cosmovisión Andina, http://www.quechuanetwork.org/sami.cfm? 
yanantin=yachay1&lang=s (translation by author) (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 187. Maili Karmacharya, Everyone Placed the World’s Burden on Gangaji: Gangaji Did Not 
Speak, Was Not Able to Say, “Don’t”, in WATER WISDOM: ORAL TESTIMONIES FROM NEPAL (Kunda 
Dixit & Dibya Subba eds., 2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] BEYOND INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS 87 
 
 
 
 
the person, the person is the land.”188 For the Kuna of Panama: “gold lives 
in [the heart]”;189 the Gikuyu of Kenya: “trees, such as the mugumo, [are] 
sacred.”190 The Zapotec of Meso-America see corn as part of the 
“fundamental autonomy,” and a legacy to their children,191 and for peoples 
of the Solomon Islands, “God lives on the trees . . . . [If you want to take 
medicine] you have to go and ask the tree first.”192 
The idea of living in harmony with nature is frequently expressed. The 
Caribbean Taino (who Las Casas reported bore the brunt of the initial 
Spanish conquest), the Guarani in South America (whose habitat has long 
preserved them from European influence) and the Ojibwas of the western 
United States were all among those associated with a desire for 
harmony.193 Finally, the idea that natural elements (living or nonliving) 
themselves have spiritual qualities (roughly an animistic idea) was the 
most common of expressions. For the Wanniya-laeto of Sri Lanka, people 
coexist with the “creatures of the forest who share a complex moral 
universe of fellow visible and invisible beings in an environment where 
everything is alive.”194 The Dineh Navajo of the United States view 
mining coal as taking the “liver” of the earth.195 For the Korekore of 
 
 
 188. TE AHUKARAMU CHARLES ROYAL, INDIGENOUS WORLDVIEWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 27 
(Te Wananga-o-Rawkawa 2002), available at http://www.mkta.co.nz/assets/sabbaticalreport31.1. 
2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 189. Kuna Cacique, Statement at the Workshop on Modernization of Panama’s Mining Code (Oct. 
2003) (notes on file with author). 
 190. Bosire Maragia, The Indigenous Sustainability Paradox and the Quest for Sustainability in 
Post-Colonial Societies: Is Indigenous Knowledge All That is Needed?, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
197, 217 (2006). 
 191. Carmelo Ruiz Marrero, Biodiversity in Danger: The Genetic Contamination of Mexican 
Maize, AMERICAS PROGRAM: INTERHEMISPHERIC RESOURCE CENTER, June 2004, available at 
http://www.americaspolicy.org/articles/2004/0406contam.html (quoting Aldo Gonzales, Zapotec 
leader); see also John Ross, Tales of Corn Wars: NAFTA Scientists Meet Representatives of 
Indigenous Groups Who Defend Their Corn, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER, Apr. 16, 2004, 
available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/printable.aspx?id=1G1:116076212. 
 192. Ruth Lilongula, Statement, in VOICES OF THE EARTH: CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES OF 
BIODIVERSITY (Darren Addison Posey ed., 2000), available at http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/ 
imgversn/105/voices.html.  
 193. With respect to the Taino, see Ivan F. Mendez-Bonilla, Taino Art, CUNY ONLINE NEWS, 
available at http://www.lehman.cuny.edu/vpadvance/artgallery/gallery/taino_treasures/mendez_ 
essay_a.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2008); with respect to the Guarani, see Las Comunidades Guaranies 
Radicadas en la Provincia de Misiones, available at http://www.cataratasdeliguazu.net/cultura_ 
guarani.htm; with respect to the Ojibwa, see WUB-E-KE-NIEW, WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXIST: A 
TRANSLATION OF ABORIGINAL INDIGENOUS THOUGHT 198–99 (1995), available at http://fore. 
research.yale.edu/religion/indigenous/texts/index.html (excerpt). 
 194. Wiveka Stegeborn, Sri Lanka: Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination—A Case Study of 
the Wanniya-laeto, in ASPIRING TO BE: THE TRIBAL/INDIGENOUS CONDITION 316, 317 (B.K. Roy 
Burman & B.G. Verghese eds., 1998). 
 195. International Indian Treaty Council, Submission to Commission on Human Rights, 59th 
Sess. (Mar. 17–Apr. 25, 2003) (quoting Kee Watchman), available at http://www.treatycouncil.org/ 
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Zimbabwe, “[b]efore we touch the land we go to the spirits. The spirits are 
linked to certain animals or trees.”196 
While there is no one way to classify the distinctive connection of 
indigenous people to the land and the environment, these examples 
provide a sense, at least, of the range of views. An indigenous 
“declaration” to the 2002 World Water Forum in Kyoto sought to 
summarize an indigenous position on water as a resource: 
We . . . reaffirm our relationship to Mother Earth and responsibility 
to future generations to raise our voices in solidarity to speak for the 
protection of water. We were placed in a sacred manner on this 
earth, each in our own sacred and traditional lands and territories to 
care for all of creation and to care for water. . . . Our relationship 
with our lands, territories and water is the fundamental physical 
cultural and spiritual basis for our existence. 197 
This declaration asserts a right of indigenous self-determination, 
including “the practice of our cultural and spiritual relationships with 
water, and the exercise of authority to govern, use, manage, regulate, 
recover, conserve, enhance and renew our water sources, without 
interference.”198 It also reaffirms that the relationship encompasses both 
land and natural resources, and the environmental impact of human 
activity on both. 
IV. APPLYING A DISTINCTIVE CONNECTION IN TRIBUNALS  
While the distinctive connection claim asserted in human rights and 
environmental instruments has been echoed by tribunals, it is more often 
cited than applied in a way that one might call distinctive. Tribunals have 
acknowledged the unique connection between indigenous communities 
and the environment and admit that this connection gives rise to specific 
rights; however, an examination of cases suggests that they turn more 
often on the recognition of rights that do not rely on this connection. 
 
 
section_21181212.htm. 
 196. Ralph Mogati, Statement, in VOICES OF THE EARTH, supra note 192.  
 197. Third World Water Forum, Kyoto, Japan, March 2003, Indigenous Peoples Kyoto Water 
Declaration ¶ 1, available at http://www.indigenouswater.org/user/IPKyotoWaterDeclarationFINAL. 
pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2008). 
 198. Id. ¶ 11. 
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A. Awas Tingni 
One of the most prominent assertions of indigenous environmental 
rights was a 2001 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
in The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua.199 The 
case involved Nicaragua’s decision in 1996 to grant a thirty-year, 62,000-
hectare timber concession to a subsidiary of a Korean company in an area 
overlapping Mayagna communal lands in one of the eastern autonomous 
regions of the country.200 The Mayagna community claimed that 
Nicaragua’s failure to demarcate their communal lands and decision to 
grant the concession without the community’s consent violated property 
rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights.201 The court agreed, finding that the community’s usufructuary 
property rights under the statute governing Nicaragua’s Atlantic regions 
should have been respected despite the fact that communal lands had not 
been titled.202 
In reaching its conclusion, the court detailed testimony about the Awas 
Tingni connection to the land. Anthropologist Theodore MacDonald 
testified: 
The hills located in the territory of the Community are very 
important. The “spirits of the mountain,” jefes del monte, which in 
Mayagna are called “Asangpas Muigeni”, live in them, and it is they 
who control the animals throughout that region. . . . There is then a 
strong tie with the surroundings, with those sacred places, with the 
spirits that live within, and the brothers who are members of the 
Community. . . . To go hunting is, to a certain point, a spiritual act, 
and it has much to do with the territory with [sic] they utilize. 203 
Anthropologist and sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen204 testified more 
generally: 
 
 
 199. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 200. Id. ¶ 2, 6. The Autonomous Atlantic Region of the North (RAAN) and South (RAAS) 
comprise roughly the eastern third of the territory of Nicaragua along the Atlantic (eastern) side 
(though they are technically located on the Caribbean Sea) and are governed by special provisions of 
the Nicaraguan Constitution. Id. ¶ 12, 17. 
 201. Id. ¶ 25 (citing the American Convention on Human Rights). 
 202. Id. ¶ 153. 
 203. Id. ¶ 83(c) (emphasis added). 
 204. Dr. Stavenhagen is Professor of Anthropology at the Colegio de México. He served as the 
first U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 
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[T]he relationship between indigenous peoples and the land is an 
essential tie which provides and maintains the cultural identity of 
those peoples. One must understand that the land is not a mere 
instrument of agricultural production, but part of a geographic and 
social, symbolic and religious space, with which the history and 
current dynamics of those peoples are linked.205  
The court credited this testimony and acknowledged the connection 
between indigenous communities and the environment, finding that “the 
close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and 
understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, 
their integrity, and their economic survival.”206  
Yet the case was pleaded and fundamentally decided as a collective 
property rights claim—despite the spiritual significance of the land to the 
Mayagna community.207 The fundamental problem in Awas Tingni was the 
failure of the state to demarcate indigenous lands and the exploitation of 
this ambiguous status to grant concessions without consultation. Had title 
been granted (as the community had a right to expect under Nicaragua’s 
Constitution208), the control of their lands and exclusion of trespassers 
would have been an issue of basic property law. Even where the state 
retains residual resource rights, the exercise of an easement to access the 
resources (in this case, timber) is again a standard property law problem. 
The special connection of the Mayagna community to the land helped the 
court affirm a right of demarcation, and it emphasized the potential 
injuries to the community from unchecked logging activities, but the 
deeper implications of the Awas Tingni’s distinctive connection to the 
land and environment did not come into play. The potential injuries and 
trespass were corporeal; and while the fact of the Awas Tingni connection 
to the land helped give the community a basis to challenge the injuries, the 
unique nature of the connection was not critical to this result. Even the 
failure to consult can be seen to have violated rights and interests that are 
not unique to indigenous peoples and do not depend upon a special 
connection to the land. 
 
 
Resumen Curricular, available at http://www.colmex.mx/centros/ces/CV-Stavenhagen.htm (last 
visited June 6, 2008). 
 205. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 83(d). 
 206. Id. ¶ 149. 
 207. See generally Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
 208. Constitution of Nicaragua, Arts. 89, 180; see also Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
¶¶ 117–18. 
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B. Belize Maya 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights faced the issue of 
development encroaching on traditional territories in a petition filed 
against the Belize government in 1998 by the ILRC and the Toledo Maya 
Cultural Council on behalf of the Mopan and Ke’kchi Maya of southern 
Belize (Belize Maya). The petition claimed the state had violated the 
American Declaration by granting logging and oil concessions to 
traditional Maya lands and “otherwise failing to adequately protect those 
lands.”209 The state’s failure to recognize and secure Maya territorial 
rights, it alleged, had “impacted negatively on the natural environment 
upon which the Maya people depend for subsistence, have jeopardized the 
Maya people and their culture, and threaten to cause further damage in the 
future.”210 
The Belize Maya held land collectively according to a traditional 
tenure system which existed alongside “a system of ‘reservations’ 
established by the British colonial administration” that had continued 
following independence in 1981,211 though the petition claimed that 
“customary land tenure patterns of the Maya communities extend well 
beyond the reservation boundaries.”212 Petitioners also asserted, and the 
Commission accepted, that petitioners were “descendents or relatives of 
Maya subgroups that have inhabited the territory at least as far back as the 
time of European exploration . . . .”213 
The Commission noted that “indigenous peoples enjoy a particular 
relationship with the lands and resources traditionally occupied and used 
by them . . . [as] integral components of [their] physical and cultural 
survival.”214 It also held that “for indigenous communities, relations to the 
land . . . [have] a material and spiritual element which they must fully 
enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future 
generations.”215 
 
 
 209. Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.122, doc. 5 rev. ¶ 2 (2004). 
 210. Id. ¶ 2. 
 211. Id. ¶ 25. Belize had been a British colony since the mid-nineteenth century. See P.A.B. 
THOMSON, BELIZE A CONCISE HISTORY (2004). 
 212. Maya Indigenous Community, 12.053 Inter-Am. C.H.R. ¶ 25. 
 213. Id. ¶ 92. The Commission found this claim of “long-standing ancestral connections” 
supported by “evidence from authorities who have studied the origins and history of the Maya-
speaking people of the Toledo District” as well as admissions on the government’s official website. Id. 
¶¶ 92–93. 
 214. Id. ¶ 114. 
 215. Id. 
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The Commission quoted the Inter-American Court’s holding in Awas 
Tingni regarding the “close ties of indigenous people with the land,”216 
emphasizing that indigenous property rights are not limited to “those 
property interests that are already recognized by states or that are defined 
by domestic law,” but instead have “autonomous meaning in international 
human rights law.”217 This includes “that indigenous communal property 
that arises from and is grounded in indigenous custom and tradition” and 
requires “special measures to ensure recognition of the particular and 
collective interest that indigenous people have in the occupation and use of 
their traditional lands and resources.”218 
The Commission concluded that the Mopan and Ke’kchi Maya people 
had “demonstrated a communal property right,” and the state’s failure to 
demarcate, title, and protect their territory violated Article XXIII of the 
American Declaration.219 The logging and oil concessions had been 
granted without prior consultation220 and had “caused environmental 
damage.”221 The Commission concluded these failures not only violated 
Belize Maya property rights, but also amounted to racial discrimination222 
and thus violated Maya equal protection rights under Article II of the 
American Declaration.”223 Again, as in Awas Tingni, the unique 
relationship to the land was important to the Commission and affirmed its 
conclusions that the Belize Maya’s collective rights had been violated. But 
again, the decision extended only to claims of demarcation, title, and prior 
consultation—basic property rights available to nonindigenous peoples as 
well. 
C. Yanomami 
In late 1980, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
considered a petition against Brazil alleging violations of Yanomami 
indigenous people’s rights resulting from the construction of a highway 
through their traditional territory which had been built to facilitate access 
to mineral deposits discovered in the 1970s.224 The influx of “highway 
 
 
 216. Id. ¶ 116. 
 217. Id. ¶ 117. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. ¶ 135. 
 220. Id. ¶ 143. 
 221. Id. ¶¶ 147–48. 
 222. Id. ¶¶ 167–71. 
 223. Id. ¶ 171. 
 224. Yanomami Community v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 12/85, Background 
¶ 2(f) (1984–1985). The Commission noted that “[b]etween 10,000 and 12,000 Yanomami Indians live 
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construction workers, geologists, mining prospectors, and farm 
workers”225 was predictably negative for the Yanomami. “The massive 
penetration of outsiders,” the petition alleged, “had devastating physical 
and psychological consequences for the Indians; it has caused the break-up 
of their age-old social organization; it has introduced prostitution among 
the women, something that was unknown; and it has resulted in many 
deaths, caused by epidemics of influenza, tuberculosis, measles, venereal 
diseases, and others.”226 
As a consequence, the Yanomami abandoned much of their territory 
and retreated further into the Amazon. The government responded with 
agricultural development projects and a proposed “Yanomami Indian 
Park” (which would have protected virtually all traditional lands).227 But 
the agricultural projects simply accelerated the loss of land and initiated a 
forced removal of Yanomami to agricultural communities where they 
could not practice their customs and traditions.228 The park project was 
halted by opposition from interests seeking to open the area to further 
development.229 
The Commission took note of Brazilian constitutional and statutory 
guarantees of indigenous rights,230 and concluded that “the failure of the 
Government of Brazil to take timely and effective measures in behalf of 
the Yanomami Indians” resulted in the violation of their rights under the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 231 While the state 
had retained subsurface mineral rights under the constitution,232 access to 
minerals on indigenous lands was limited to “cases of great national 
interest, by federal public entities,” and had to be approved by the 
administrative agency established to protect indigenous interests, 
Fundaçäo Nacional do Indio (FUNAI).233 The Commission found that 
 
 
in the State of Amazonas and the Territory of Roraima, on the Brazilian border with Venezuela.” Id. 
Background ¶ 2(a). 
 225. Id. Considerations ¶ 10(a). 
 226. Id. Background ¶ 3(a). 
 227. Id. Background ¶ 2(j). 
 228. Id. Background ¶ 3(c). 
 229. Id. Background ¶ 3(f). 
 230. See id. Background ¶ 2(b) (citing CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] amend. 1/69, art. 198); id. 
Background ¶ 2(c) (quoting Estatuto do Indio, No. 6000, de la de dezembro de 1973 (Braz.) art. 23). 
 231. See id. Resolves ¶ 1. 
 232. C.F. art. 168 (Braz.). 
 233. Indigenous peoples are considered “relatively incompetent” and thus under the 
“guardianship” of FUNAI under article 6 of the Brazilian Civil Code. FUNAI was created under the 
Ministry of Interior “for the defense, protection, and preservation of the interest and cultural heritage 
of the Indians and also to promote programs and projects related to their social and economic 
development.” Yanomami, 7615 Inter-Am. C.H.R. Background ¶ 2(e). 
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FUNAI had failed to exercise its fiduciary obligations.234 The Commission 
found violations of the right to life, liberty, and personal security; 
residence and movement; and preservation of health and well-being,235 
finding the displacement had “all the negative consequences for their 
culture, traditions, and costumes.”236 The Commission did not, however, 
find a violation of Yanomami property rights, though it had been pleaded 
and it was clear that encroachment on traditional lands was at the heart of 
the injury to the Yanomami communities.237 The Commission also did not 
make specific reference to a distinctive connection to the land, but did note 
“that for historical reasons and because of moral and humanitarian 
principles, special protection for indigenous populations constitutes a 
sacred commitment of the states.”238 The Commission also noted that the 
Organization of American States (OAS) had made “the preservation and 
strengthening of the cultural heritage” of ethnic groups and threats to their 
“cultural identity” a priority.239 Thus, while the 1982 decision did not 
specifically use the language that has since emerged regarding a distinctive 
connection—indeed, it did not rest its decision on property rights 
allegations—there is a sense that the unique cultural relationship of the 
Yanomami to their land is, in part, driving the Commission’s result. Yet 
the Commission did nothing to suggest that unique relationship created 
rights beyond those afforded by national law. 
D. Lubicon Lake Band 
In 1984, the U.N. Human Rights Committee received a communication 
from the Lubicon Lake Band (the Band), a Cree Indian band in Alberta, 
Canada, alleging that governmental decisions to allow development on 
their lands violated the Band’s right of self-determination for economic, 
social and cultural development, and the right not to be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).240 The Band is “a self-identified, relatively 
autonomous, socio-cultural and economic group” whose “members have 
 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. Resolution ¶ 1. 
 236. Id. Considerations ¶ 2. 
 237. This may be because the Commission found that the government was already taking relevant 
steps to address property rights concerns through the Yanomami Park proposal. Id. Considerations 
¶ 12. 
 238. Id. Considerations ¶ 8. 
 239. Id. Considerations ¶ 9.  
 240. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Committee [H.R.C.], Commc’n No. 
167/1984, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990). 
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continuously inhabited, hunted, trapped and fished in a large area 
encompassing approximately 10,000 square kilometers in northern Alberta 
since time immemorial.”241 It alleged that development activities 
threatened “the destruction of [its] environmental and economic base” and 
“would make it impossible for the Band to survive as a people for many 
more years.”242 The Band’s “existence,” it asserted, was “seriously 
threatened by the oil and gas development that has been allowed to 
proceed unchecked on their traditional hunting grounds and in complete 
disregard for the human community inhabiting the area.”243 Though the 
Band’s initial communication concerned the environmental and cultural 
impact of oil and gas exploration, a later submission alleged Canada had 
leased “all but 25.4 square miles of the Band's traditional lands for 
development, in conjunction with a pulp mill . . . .”244 The claim alleged 
Canada had violated the antidiscrimination provisions of ICCPR Article 
2(1), failing to take into consideration “elements of a social, economic and 
property nature inherent in the Band's indigenous community structure.”245 
Although Canada claimed that domestic judicial remedies had not been 
exhausted, the Band contended that even a successful permanent 
injunction “would come too late” to “bring back the animals,” “restore the 
environment,” or undo destruction of Band members’ “traditional way of 
life” or damages to their “spiritual and cultural ties to the land.”246 Canada 
also initially objected that “the Lubicon Lake Band is not a people within 
the meaning of [A]rticle 1 of the Covenant,”247 and that the 
 
 
 241. Id. ¶ 2.2. 
 242. Id. ¶ 3.2. 
 243. Id. ¶ 12(a). 
 244. Id. ¶ 18.1 
 245. Id. ¶ 16.1. In addition to the Article 2 violations, the Band alleged violations of the Article 6 
right to life, claiming the government’s actions had  
created a situation which “led, indirectly if not directly, to the deaths of 21 persons and [is] 
threatening the lives of virtually every other member of the Lubicon community. Moreover, 
the ability of the community to [survive] is in serious doubt as the number of miscarriages 
and stillbirths has skyrocketed and the number of abnormal births . . . has gone from near zero 
to near 100 per cent.” 
Id. ¶ 16.2 (alteration in original). 
 246. Id. ¶ 11.2. 
 247. Id. ¶ 6.1. The Lubicon Lake Band later complained that Canada had “fabricate[d]” a 
“Woodland Cree Band,” to assert a “competing claim to traditional Lubicon lands . . . in further 
violation of [A]rticles 1, 26 and 27 of the Covenant.” Id. ¶ 27.5. The Lubicon Lake Band alleged that 
the “Woodland Cree” was  
a group of disparate individuals drawn together by Canada from a dozen different 
communities scattered across Alberta and British Columbia, who have no history as an 
organized aboriginal society and no relation as a group to the traditional territory of the 
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communication was made by an individual seeking to assert a collective 
right,248 but later conceded “that the Lubicon Lake Band has suffered a 
historical inequity and that they are entitled to a reserve and related 
entitlements.”249 
The Human Rights Committee concluded that both “[h]istorical 
inequities . . . and certain more recent developments threaten the way of 
life and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band, and constitute a violation of 
[A]rticle 27 so long as they continue.”250 It found, however, that the 
government’s offer of a territorial reserve and other accommodations 
would, if accepted, enable the Band to “maintain its culture, control its 
way of life and achieve economic self-sufficiency,”251 and that this was a 
sufficient remedy “within the meaning of [A]rticle 2 of the Covenant.”252  
A separate opinion by Nisuke Ando conceded “[i]t is not impossible 
that a certain culture is closely linked to a particular way of life and that 
industrial exploration of natural resources may affect the Band’s 
traditional way of life, including hunting and fishing,” but objected to the 
idea that “the right to enjoy one’s own culture should not be understood to 
imply that the Band’s traditional way of life must be preserved intact at all 
costs.” 253 Though Ando was concerned about the scope of cultural 
protection available, he obliquely articulated a connection between 
indigenous culture and the impact of development in a way that the 
Committee had not, by emphasizing the close link of certain cultures to a 
“particular way of life” connected to the environment. While the 
Committee found merely that the facts of the instant case manifested a 
violation of cultural rights,254 Ando’s challenge asks rather directly how 
one balances development interests within a dominant culture with the 
competing interests of indigenous peoples to defend their own way of life 
within that dominant culture. 
 
 
Lubicon Lake Band [in an effort to] . . . undermine the traditional Lubicon society and to 
subvert Lubicon land rights. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 248. Id. ¶ 6.1. The government of Canada pointed out that the Lubicon Lake Band “comprises 
only one of 582 Indian bands in Canada and a small portion of a larger group of Cree Indians residing 
in northern Alberta. It is therefore the position of the Government of Canada that the Lubicon Lake 
Indians are not a ‘people.’” Id. ¶ 6.2. 
 249. Id. ¶ 24.1. 
 250. Id. ¶ 33. 
 251. Id. ¶ 24.1; see also id. ¶ 17.1. 
 252. Id. ¶ 24.1. 
 253. Id. app. I (original emphasis omitted).  
 254. In fact, the Committee seemed to be applying a fact-dependent test in assessing a possible 
Article 27 violation. See id. ¶ 13.4. 
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E. Ilmari Länsman 
In 1992, Ilmari Länsman and other reindeer breeders of Sami ethnic 
origin, all members of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen's Committee 
(Herdsmen), complained to the U.N. Human Rights Committee that a 
contract by Finland’s Central Forestry Board to allow stone quarrying on 
the side of a mountain they considered sacred, and transportation of the 
stone directly through a “complex system of reindeer fences” and along a 
road through territory traditionally claimed by the Herdsmen, violated 
their rights under Article 27 of the ICCPR.255 While title to traditional 
Sami lands was disputed by Finland, there was no dispute that the 
activities would affect lands traditionally used by the Herdsmen. They 
asserted that the quarry site “is a sacred place of the old Sami religion,”256 
and allowing quarrying and transporting, they alleged, would violate “their 
right to enjoy their own culture, which has traditionally been and remains 
essentially based on reindeer husbandry.”257 
Finland responded that national authorization had followed a locally-
granted permit from the Angeli Municipal Board, and maintained that the 
Herdsmen and others in their community had been adequately 
consulted.258 The extent of environmental damage from the quarrying and 
transportation was also disputed.259 Finland conceded that “the concept of 
culture in the sense of [A]rticle 27 provides for a certain protection of the 
traditional means of livelihood for national minorities and can be deemed 
to cover livelihood and related conditions insofar as they are essential for 
the culture and necessary for its survival.”260 It also acknowledged “the 
concept ‘culture’ in [A]rticle 27 covers reindeer herding as an ‘essential 
component of the Sami culture’.”261 The state maintained, however, that 
planned quarrying activities would affect only a very limited part of the 
 
 
 255. Länsman v. Finland, U.N.H.R.C., Commc’n No. 511/1992, ¶ 2.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994).  
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. ¶ 3.1. The Herdsmen also cited in support of their claim ILO No. 169 “concerning the 
rights of indigenous and tribal people in independent countries.” Id. ¶ 3.2. 
 258. Id. ¶ 4.1. The state also raised procedural objections. 
 259. The Committee considered, for example, allegations that even “the marks and scars left by 
the provisional road allegedly will remain in the landscape for hundreds of years, because of extreme 
climatic conditions.” Id. ¶ 5.3. The state countered that “possible harm to the environment remains 
minor,” and that “special attention was paid . . . to avoid disturbing reindeer husbandry . . . .” Id. ¶ 7.7. 
 260. Id. ¶ 7.10. 
 261. Id. ¶ 7.3 
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land (about 2.5 acres) and thus would have “no significance on the bearing 
capacity of the pastures” of the Herdsmen.262  
Finland argued that reindeer husbandry is protected under national law 
and that local officials paid “special attention” in granting their permit “to 
avoid disturbing reindeer husbandry in the area.”263 It also noted that the 
state’s contract, issued pursuant to the local permit, required 
environmental mitigation measures,264 and that the contract both assigned 
liability to the contractor for any significant environmental “or other” 
damage caused by quarrying activities and could be cancelled if 
“extraction of land resources has had unpredictable harmful environmental 
effects.”265 In addition to these protections, Finland asserted that the 
impact of the quarrying activities would not threaten “the survival and 
continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity” of the 
Sami, which is the central concern of Article 27.266 The Herdsmen, it 
argued, could “continue to practise reindeer husbandry and are not forced 
to abandon their lifestyle.”267 
After weighing these competing claims, the Human Rights Committee 
found it undisputed that the Herdsmen are a minority under Article 27 
with a right to enjoy their own culture,268 and that “reindeer husbandry is 
an essential element of their culture.”269 The Committee also found that 
the mountain “continues to have a spiritual significance relevant to [Sami] 
culture” and noted the Herdsmen’s concern “that the quality of slaughtered 
reindeer could be adversely affected by a disturbed environment.”270 The 
Committee nevertheless found no breach of Article 27 because it held that 
the impact of quarrying had been minimal and that the Herdsmen had been 
sufficiently consulted in the permitting and contracting processes 
conducted by local and national authorities.271 
 
 
 262. Id. ¶ 7.6. The state suggested that the nature of the quarrying procedure would be only 
minimally disruptive and provided an opinion of the Environmental Office of the Lapland County 
Administrative Board that “only low pressure explosives are used to extract stone from the rock: 
‘Extraction is carried out my means of sawing and wedging techniques . . . to keep the rock as whole 
as possible.’” Id. ¶ 7.7. 
 263. Id. ¶ 7.7 
 264. Id. ¶ 7.5. 
 265. Id. ¶ 7.3. 
 266. Id. ¶ 7.12. 
 267. Id. ¶ 7.13. 
 268. Id. ¶ 9.2. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. ¶ 9.3. 
 271. Id. ¶ 9.6. 
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Significantly, the Committee rejected Finland’s claim of a “margin of 
appreciation”272 where cultural rights are at issue under Article 27,273 
relying instead on its findings that the scope of activity had been 
sufficiently disruptive to Sami culture and that the Herdsmen were 
afforded an opportunity to participate in the process.274 It nevertheless 
cautioned that future development must “be carried out in a way that the 
authors continue to benefit from reindeer husbandry” and noted that a 
significant expansion of mining activities in the Angeli area “may 
constitute a violation of the authors’ rights under [A]rticle 27, in particular 
of their right to enjoy their own culture.”275 
Here, as in the Inter-American cases, we see the tribunal reciting 
claims of a special connection and still essentially falling back on 
traditional property claims—in this case, more in the nature of nuisance—
and a right to prior consultation. The Committee had an opportunity to 
find that the unique nature of the Sami’s relationship to the mountain and 
its herding practices called for special scrutiny or raised the prospect of a 
unique injury, but failed to do so. 
V. A DISTINCTIVE CONNECTION DOCTRINE—BEYOND PROPERTY 
It is perhaps ironic that the nature of indigenous peoples’ relationship 
to the land—once used to deny sovereignty and to mask conquest as 
“discovery” in cases such as M’Intosh276—has, under the human rights 
regime, become a justification for protecting remaining descendents of the 
peoples dispossessed. The irony is compounded by the growing claim in 
recent anthropological literature that many indigenous peoples historically 
had far more complex relationships with the land as cultivators, engineers, 
and botanists than even sympathetic twentieth-century advocates may have 
imagined. The work of Professors William Balée, Darrell Posey, R. Brian 
Ferguson, and Leslie Sponsel, among others in the emerging field of 
historical ecology, challenges the idea of ecologically naïve or 
unsophisticated “pre-encounter” indigenous communities.277 What one 
 
 
 272. Id. ¶ 9.4. 
 273. Id.  
 274. Id. ¶ 9.5 (citing General Comment on Article 27 of the ICCPR (1994) ¶ 7); id. ¶ 9.6. 
 275. Id. ¶ 9.8. 
 276. Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
 277. See generally ADVANCES IN HISTORICAL ECOLOGY (William Balée ed., 1998) and works 
produced therein: R. Brian Ferguson, Whatever Happened to the Stone Age? Steel Tools and 
Yanomami Historical Ecology, in HISTORICAL ECOLOGY, supra, at 287; Darrell A. Posey, Diachronic 
Ecotones and Anthropogenic Landscapes in Amazonia: Contesting the Consciousness of Conservation, 
in HISTORICAL ECOLOGY, supra, at 104; Leslie E. Sponsel, The Historical Ecology of Thailand: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:53 
 
 
 
 
legal scholar terms a tendency to “live lightly on the land,”278 is 
understood by these social science scholars who study past and present 
indigenous settlement and land use patterns as resulting from a complex 
interaction of culture, cosmology, and choice practiced for generations (as 
the M’Intosh Court might put it, “from time immemorial”279). While these 
scholars acknowledge ambiguities and do not claim to have a full 
understanding of the field, the evidence they have uncovered (often 
literally unearthed) certainly does not support a claim of terra nullius or 
domicilium vacuum. 
But we are left with nation-states constructed on these ideas—or, as 
Professor Thornberry reminds us, constructed more often on assertions of 
right growing from conquest or from treaties written in the languages of 
those who harbored such ideas.280 The conceit of spiritual, moral, cultural, 
and technological superiority begat sovereign assertions—first in the 
countryside, and later the courtrooms—that lay at the foundation of many 
of the states which today frame and implement the international legal 
system. Yet that system seems willing to hand some measure of right back 
to the descendents of the dispossessed.281 
Some of the claims made in this process of what one might call 
“retrocession”—that indigenous peoples have a distinctive connection to 
the land—thus appear ironic in light of the historical context against which 
the legal protections of indigenous land rights are now being framed.282 
This argues for special attention to the claim of a distinctive connection 
 
 
Increasing Thresholds of Human Environmental Impact from Prehistory to the Present, in 
HISTORICAL ECOLOGY, supra, at 376; see also RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY (2003). 
 278. Peter Manus, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environment-Based Cultures: The 
Emerging Voice of Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 553, 555 (2005). This 
thesis should not be confused with what some in the anthropological literature have criticized as a 
tendency to see indigenous peoples as “ecologically noble savages.” See, e.g., Allyn MacLean 
Stearman, Revisiting the Myth of the Ecologically Noble Savage in Amazonia: Implications for 
Indigenous Land Rights, 49 CULTURE & AGRICULTURE 2, 2–6 (1994). 
 279. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 30–33. 
 280. THORNBERRY, supra note 24. 
 281. See generally Adriana Fabra, Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Degradation, and Human 
Rights: A Case Study, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 245 (Alan 
Boyle & Michael Anderson eds., 1996); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL 
THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1996); Darlene M. Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights: A 
Question of Group Self-Preservation, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 179 (Will Kymlicka 
ed., 2006). This willingness, however, remains tenuous. Witness the objections of states which 
benefited from conquest and discovery doctrines to the terms of the 2007 U.N. Declaration, supra note 
8. 
 282. The irony is that indigenous peoples’ unique relationship to the land was historically used to 
justify dispossession (see, for example, M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543 and Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 
175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.)) and now it is being used to justify the recognition of land rights.  
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and particularly to a need to understand the connection in terms set out by 
indigenous peoples themselves, lest the international legal system find 
itself making yet another set of presumptions about distant or alien 
cultures that peoples and nation states come to regret in another 500 years. 
There is a danger of engaging in what anthropologists might call 
“essentializing” the relationship indigenous cultures have to the land for 
the sake of classifying and managing it doctrinally, and this danger should 
also be borne in mind.283 
This is an argument for care in the further development and application 
of a distinctive connection doctrine, not an argument for rejecting it. The 
instruments and indigenous claims cited above affirm that there is 
something socially, culturally, and spiritually unique about how many 
indigenous communities understand and use their traditional lands. The 
acknowledgement of that relationship by institutions and tribunals has had 
a discernable impact on how tribunals decide indigenous land claims by 
providing a rationale for collective rights, for recognizing tenure where 
uses are not intensive or exploitive, and for giving indigenous 
communities a voice in development decision making. 
The first important impact has been that the land connectedness of 
indigenous peoples has helped validate the assertion of collective property 
rights on behalf of indigenous communities. The ability to define 
boundaries, to live and make use of resources within those boundaries, and 
to exclude trespassers is a fundamental characteristic of property law. This 
 
 
 283. As used by anthropologists, the term has been defined as characterizing representations that 
“freez[e] and reify[] an identity in a way that hides the historical processes and politics within which it 
develops.” Jean E. Jackson & Kay B. Warren, Indigenous Movements in Latin America, 1992–2004: 
Controversies, Ironies, New Directions, 34 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 549, 559 (2005). This presents 
problems for social scientists, because it can reduce intragroup diversity to idealized, homogenized 
images which confer political power (and thus, perhaps, legal rights) only so long as Indians’ political 
identities resonate with Western ideas and symbols. Beth A. Conklin & Laura R. Graham, The Shifting 
Middle Ground: Amazonian Indians and Eco-Politics, 97 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 4, 695, 706 (1995); 
see also J. Peter Brosius, Analyses and Interventions: Anthropological Engagements with 
Environmentalism, 40 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 3 (1999). The danger of this phenomenon in law can 
be seen in the understanding of indigenous land relationships which helped justify the results in cases 
such as M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543, and Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. 1. Even where the essential characteristics 
are seen as positive and policy results are benign or constructive there remains a danger of viewing an 
authentic identity as limited or static. See, e.g., Alcida Rita Ramos, Cutting Through State and Class: 
Sources and Strategies of Self-Representation in Latin America, in INDIGENEOUS MOVEMENTS, SELF-
REPRESENTATION, AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 251 (Kay B. Warren & Jean E. Jackson eds., 
2002). Though a more positive understanding of indigenous land relationships is evident in the 
evolving recognition of a distinctive connection, this understanding should neither be used to negate 
the complex relationship of indigenous peoples with the land nor be constructed in a way that could 
limit, rather than confer, indigenous land and resource rights.  
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ability has been upheld for communities in cases such as Awas Tingni,284 
Yanomami,285 and Lubicon Lake Band286 based at least in part on the 
tribunals’ recognition of the special connection that these communities had 
to the land. Though not held in fee simple or under another title 
recognized in common law or civil law systems, the results were the same. 
Despite the lack of sovereignty, these communities were seen to have a 
property claim beyond the mere possessory rights once recognized in 
M’Intosh.287 
The distinctive connection has also promoted respect for collective 
tenure in terms of a community’s historical and cultural appropriate use. 
At one time, for example, theorists and courts would have rejected the idea 
that a group of 150 people living in a small collection of dwellings and 
hunting or gathering in an area covering 20,000 acres could claim any kind 
of right to the entire area. Even discounting ideas such as terra nullius, 
more persistent and time honored legal doctrines such as best use and 
adverse possession could undermine any such claim. Yet a respect for a 
distinctive indigenous connection provides a meaningful counterweight to 
these longstanding doctrines. Put simply, this is how the land is used by 
some indigenous peoples; the lack of fencing, grazing, cultivation, paper 
titles, or specific vigilance against trespass are deprived of legal 
consequence, or at least diminished in their effect. The Inter-American 
Commission held as much in Belize Maya.288 Respect for collective tenure, 
moreover, as an element of how an indigenous group owns or “holds” its 
land, minimizes intrusion into the community’s decisions about resource 
use and allocation and assures a generational continuity that might 
otherwise be undermined. 
Respect for a distinctive connection has also grounded the assertion of 
a right to participate in development decisions and in the benefits of 
development that occur on or influence indigenous lands. Even where 
indigenous communities lack an exclusive right to natural resources on the 
lands they have traditionally used, a respect for their unique relationship 
has provided a basis for requiring that they be consulted and participate 
meaningfully in development choices that may affect their interests. The 
 
 
 284. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni, Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 285. Yanomami Community v. Brazil, Case 7615 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 12/85 (1984–85). 
 286. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, U.N.H.R.C., Commc’n No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 
(1990). 
 287. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543. 
 288. Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053 Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser. L/V/U.122, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2004). 
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result in Awas Tingni, for example, rested in large part on the fact that the 
government had failed to consult the community about an activity 
(logging) that would have an impact on the spiritual and cultural values it 
places on the land.289 Similarly, in Ilmari Länsman, though the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee rejected Sami Herdsmen opposition to 
quarrying activity on their traditional lands, it did so largely on the basis 
that community members had been consulted and the activity had been 
approved first at a local level in a town recognized as being largely of 
Sami origin.290 The Committee also noted that any further mining activity 
would require continuing consultation and would need to be carried out in 
a way that respected the Herdsmen’s traditional reliance on reindeer 
husbandry.291 The Committee expressed a similar concern in Lubicon Lake 
Band for resource development (in that case, oil and gas) to be conducted 
in a way that assured the ability of the Band to maintain its culture and 
way of life.292 
While the recognition of a distinctive connection should not be seen as 
the lone basis for the result in any of these cases, it certainly gave weight 
to the tribunals’ decisions and helped shape outcomes that responded to 
each indigenous community’s unique circumstances and interests. These 
cases, and the range of instruments also discussed, can be seen as 
advancing a distinctive connection doctrine that has helped relate the 
nonphysical relationship of indigenous peoples to the land (with strong 
spiritual and cultural dimensions) to the very corporeal understandings of 
land rights as they have evolved through common law and civil law 
property regimes.  
Yet the underlying foundations of the doctrine imply much more than a 
mere translation of these deeper cultural values to the language of Western 
property law. Claims of a distinctive connection—especially when viewed 
in the terms offered by indigenous peoples and their advocates—cannot be 
easily cabined within the constraints of property or even natural resources 
law.293 There is a dynamic aspect to indigenous land references that speaks 
more about ecological integrity than merely physical integrity. The manner 
 
 
 289. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 79. 
 290. Länsman v. Finland, U.N.H.R.C., Commc’n No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/ 
1952 (1994). 
 291. Id. ¶ 9.8. 
 292. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, U.N.H.R.C., Commc’n No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 
(1990). 
 293. This is not to say that traditional property and natural resources doctrine cannot address some 
indigenous concerns relating to land and the environment. But traditional doctrine has distinct and 
demonstrable limitations. 
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of land and natural resource (even landscape) dependence—its integration 
as a spiritual as well as physical provider—cannot count on doctrines of 
title and trespass alone for vindication. The references to harmony with 
nature so common in the indigenous expression of a land connectedness294 
do not appear to be an artifact of popular Western discourse, but rather a 
dominant historical theme in indigenous land relationships.295 
What does this say, then, about the distinctive connection doctrine? 
While it has served to substantiate collective indigenous land rights, 
tenurial relationships, and participatory rights, there are other legal 
theories and doctrines not reliant upon a unique relationship that can 
accomplish the same ends.296 More importantly, the distinctive connection 
is not by its terms limited to a physical claim. There is a sense that the 
doctrine, by bringing a focus to what is unique about indigenous land 
claims in the spiritual and cultural sense, could do more. 
A. Cultural and Spiritual Standing—Moiwana Village 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights gave a hint at what a 
nonphysical land-related claim might look like in Moiwana Village v. 
Suriname.297 In that case, descendants of escaped African slaves who 
claimed a degree of autonomy over the lands their ancestors had occupied 
since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries298 could not return to their 
village because the violent deaths of women, children and the elderly there 
during Suriname’s civil war left them fearful and concerned over the 
spirits of the victims.299 Though not asking to be seen as indigenous, the 
 
 
 294. See discussion supra Part III.F. 
 295. See supra note 276. 
 296. Property rights are universally affirmed in human rights instruments, see e.g., Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc 
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), as are rights of participation, id. art. 27; the affirmation of collective rights 
does not depend on a cultural or spiritual tie to land. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, arts. 1–2, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 
(the right of “all peoples” to self determination and to “freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources” is not limited to those with unique ties to the land). 
 297. 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005). 
 298. Moiwana Village was part of a larger community of the N’djuka Maroon peoples of 
Suriname. They are descendants of slaves who escaped to rainforest areas in the eastern part of 
Suriname’s present national territory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that had signed 
treaties with the state in 1760 and 1837 that established semi-autonomous regions with settled 
boundaries. Id. ¶ 86(1)-(4). “Although individual members of indigenous and tribal communities are 
considered natural persons by Suriname’s Constitution, the State’s legal framework does not recognize 
such communities as legal entities. . . . [N]ational legislation does not provide for collective property 
rights.” Id. ¶ 86(5). 
 299. Id. ¶ 86(43). 
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villagers have analogous claims to their own language, history, as well as 
cultural and religious traditions. The Court found that “a N’djuka 
community’s connection to its traditional land is of vital spiritual, cultural 
and material importance,”300 and credited expert testimony that, like 
indigenous communities, the N’djuka have an “all-encompassing 
relationship to their ancestral lands. They are inextricably tied to these 
lands.”301 The court also recounted testimony that the N’djuka’s “inability 
to maintain their relationships with their ancestral lands and its sacred sites 
has deprived them of a fundamental aspect of their identity and sense of 
well being.”302 The court concluded that the state’s failure to investigate 
the deaths in the village had perpetuated the dislocation of villagers,303 
citing their testimony that “only when justice is accomplished in the case 
will they be able to appease the angry spirits of their deceased family 
members, purify their land, and return to permanent residence without 
apprehension of further hostilities.”304 
The court ordered Suriname to investigate the villagers’ deaths; to 
recover their remains and facilitate proper burial; to “carry out a public 
ceremony” recognizing its responsibility; to issue an apology; and, to build 
a “memorial in a suitable public location.”305 
In Moiwana Village, then, there is recognition of a unique relationship 
to ancestral lands substantiating rights and warranting relief that certainly 
exceeds the rights that might be recognized and relief that might be 
granted under common law and civil law property regimes. By extension, 
the injury to resources, species, and landscapes held sacred by indigenous 
peoples might be seen as similarly cognizable under a distinctive 
connection doctrine offering more culturally relevant protection to the land 
interests of indigenous peoples. Just as the N’djuka’s relationship to their 
land compelled the Inter-American Court to fashion relief appropriate to 
the nature of the relationship, the distinctive connection of indigenous 
peoples to their traditional lands should be protected where relevant, 
beyond rights of demarcation, title, and participation.  
 
 
 300. Id. ¶ 101. 
 301. Id. ¶ 132.  
 302. Id.  
 303. Id. ¶ 134. 
 304. Id. ¶ 86(43). 
 305. Id. ¶ 233. 
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B. Ecology as Culture 
The application of a distinctive connection doctrine should include at a 
minimum some recognition that impacts on species or ecosystems 
important to indigenous peoples be measured (or at least comprehended) 
and minimized. The protection of biodiversity in this sense is not always 
limited to the policing of trespass on demarcated lands. It may include, for 
example, the protection of migratory species upon which indigenous 
peoples depend or the protection of habitat or landscapes central to 
indigenous culture or custom. It would certainly extend to activities with a 
transboundary impact, such as pollutant transport.306 It might also include 
giving indigenous communities standing to sue in cases where they are 
uniquely affected by a nuisance or another incident, the impact of which 
has cultural or spiritual implications. 
C. Recent Cases in Point—Unheralded Cultural Claims 
If environment (in its broadest sense, to include ecosystems, species, 
and landscapes) were fully appreciated as part of indigenous culture, then 
indigenous claims could be understood to extend beyond basic property 
rights such as title and excluding trespass. This would give indigenous 
communities standing to seek redress for environmental impacts that 
encroach upon cultural or spiritual interests without a physical trespass.307 
For example, following the grounding of the Exxon Valdez off the coast of 
Alaska in 1989, Inuit communities were denied standing by the U.S. 
courts because the injury to their “subsistence way of life” was not deemed 
a compensable injury.308 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
“the right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated nature, and 
cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual and psychological benefits in 
pristine natural surroundings is shared by all Alaskans.”309 Application of 
a distinctive connection doctrine might have led to a different result. It 
would certainly oblige the court to address how Inuit traditions, and their 
 
 
 306. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1935). 
 307. This idea may sound relatively esoteric until one considers the example of regulatory takings 
jurisprudence in the U.S., which recognizes and compensates for the expropriation of economic, but 
non-physical property interests. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). While some might argue that economic interests differ from 
social and cultural concerns, international human rights law places the three in the same class. 
 308. Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 309. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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cultural and spiritual connection to the land, might be seen as distinct from 
the relationship of others.310 
A more recent case before the U.N. Committee for the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) also raises questions for which a distinctive 
connection doctrine could provide guidance. The case involves a 
longstanding dispute over the U.S. government’s efforts to evict two 
Western Shoshone sisters, Carrie and Mary Dann, from rangeland that is 
part of a much larger area encompassing tens of millions of acres in 
western states which the Danns claimed their ancestors had used “from 
time immemorial.”311 The United States asserted that aboriginal title to all 
Shoshone lands, including the disputed area, had long ago been 
“extinguished” through “gradual encroachment.”312  
When the Inter-American Commission reviewed the case, it 
acknowledged, as it had before, “a particular connection between 
communities of indigenous peoples and the lands and resources that they 
have traditionally occupied and used,”313 and found that the United States 
had failed to ensure the Danns’ right to property “under conditions of 
equality.”314 The United States essentially ignored the Commission Report 
and acted instead to evict the Dann sisters from the disputed rangeland,315 
so they sought the intervention of the CERD.316 In addition to addressing 
the Dann sisters’ property rights claims, the CERD expressed specific 
concern over proposed surface mining near the Danns’ ranch and a 
proposed nuclear waste repository approximately two hundred miles south 
of the ranch (on traditional Western Shoshone lands).317 Though the 
United States responded to the CERD’s concerns over the underlying 
property rights issues, it did not take up the questions about mining and 
 
 
 310. See also Günther Handl, Indigenous Peoples’ Subsistence Lifestyle as an Environmental 
Valuation Problem, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: 
PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND VALUATION 85 (Michael Bowman & Alan Boyle eds., 2002).  
 311. United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 43 (1985). 
 312. United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, Dann, 470 U.S. 
39. 
 313. Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11,140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02 
¶ 125, 128 (2002) (citing The Human Rights Situation of the Indigenous People in the Americas, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108, doc. 62 21–25 (2000)). 
 314. Dann, 11.140 Inter-Am. C.H.R. No. 75/02 ¶ 172. 
 315. Id. ¶ 179; see also Amnesty Int’l USA, Report on Western Shoshone (2003), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/justearth/indigenous_people/western_shoshone.html (last visited Aug. 31, 
2007). 
 316. U.N. Comm. for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], Early Warning and 
Urgent Action Procedure Decision 1(68), GE.06-41251 [hereinafter CERD Early Action Letter]. 
 317. Id. ¶ 7(b). 
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nuclear waste.318 These issues certainly raise broader environmental 
concerns that might affect the cultural and spiritual rights of the Dann 
sisters as well as other Western Shoshone, and it may be an area where a 
distinctive connection doctrine could be employed.  
A distinctive connection doctrine might also provide a useful point of 
analysis in the more recent claim by the Circumpolar Inuit Conference 
regarding the impact of U.S. energy and climate policy on their ability to 
sustain, among other things, a traditional lifestyle. The case was filed in 
December 2005 with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
which decided the following year not to proceed with the matter.319 The 
Commission issued no formal decision in the case, and expressed concern 
to the petitioners that it would be difficult to establish a causal link 
between U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and climate change as well as 
concern that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the many states 
contributing to the climate problem.320  
While the Inuit petition alleges that U.S. climate policy may constitute 
a wide range of human rights violations, and makes reference to Inuit 
“close ties to the land and the environment,”321 it does not develop the 
argument of a distinctive connection or address its implications for the 
impact of climate change on the Inuit. To the extent that the claim can be 
cast as a defense of Inuit cultural rights to property, shelter, and a broader 
range of economic, cultural, and spiritual interests, it may be easier to find 
that the United States has an obligation to work toward the progressive 
realization of Inuit rights through long-term policy decisions,322 rather than 
finding that its contribution to greenhouse gases is distinguishable from a 
range of other factors and parties over whom the Commission has no 
jurisdiction. The nature of the Inuit relationship to land itself might give 
the petitioners’ standing to claim relief that others who are differently 
affected by climate change cannot seek. Certainly, their injury is distinct 
 
 
 318. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT TO THE UN COMMITTEE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION, annex II (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/cerd_report/ 
83406.htm. 
 319. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights 
Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the 
United States (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal_docs/petition-to-
the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-on-behalf-of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf 
[hereinafter Inuit Petition]; June George, 1CC Climate Change Petition Rejected, Nunatsiaq News 
(Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.nunatsiaq.com/archives/61215/news/nunavut/61215_02.html 
(last visited June 6, 2008). 
 320. Interview by author with participants in public hearing, March 2006.  
 321. Inuit Petition, supra note 319, at 72. 
 322. See, e.g., South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001(1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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and disproportionate—not just because of where they live, but how they 
live. If their distinctive connection were clearly recognized as a cultural or 
spiritual right, the Commission might be persuaded, as the South African 
Constitutional Court in Grootboom, to find the state should work 
progressively toward a culturally-appropriate solution, regardless of 
myriad other factors that may be affecting the right.  
These examples simply raise possible applications of a distinctive 
connection doctrine if it is seen as something more than merely a basis for 
sustaining core property rights. The language used by instruments, 
advocates, and tribunals would seem to provide a basis for these 
applications, if the connection is appreciated for what it is—a unique 
cultural and spiritual relationship to land and the environment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A distinctive connection doctrine can be plainly seen emerging from 
the human rights framework for the protection of indigenous peoples. It 
has helped justify the assertion of collective property rights by indigenous 
communities, led to greater respect for tenurial relationships common 
among indigenous communities, and secured a right to participate in 
decision making relating to indigenous lands. Yet the emergence of this 
doctrine both calls for caution and offers promise. 
The caution is a concern that indigenous property and environmental 
rights may be seen to depend on the distinctive connection of indigenous 
peoples to the land rather than the assertion of basic and universal rights to 
which indigenous peoples are entitled regardless of their land 
connectedness. It is not necessarily harmful to recognize a distinctive 
connection while relying on traditional property and antidiscrimination 
doctrine, and it seems clear that the unique connection of indigenous 
peoples to land and the environment has helped secure those traditional 
rights which were historically denied. But the doctrines should not be 
conflated, and tribunals should clarify that indigenous land rights are 
fundamentally based on universal principles and universally applicable 
legal principles. 
The promise is that the distinctive connection might be more 
effectively deployed where unique attributes of indigenous peoples are 
particularly relevant to address ecological harms and assert environmental 
rights. Where traditions and beliefs of indigenous communities make them 
particularly vulnerable to the environmental consequences of 
governmental policy and development, the doctrine might serve to 
overcome the hesitance of tribunals to consider indigenous assertions of 
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right and offer standing to indigenous communities to challenge injuries 
that affect their unique connection to the land, resources, and 
environment.323 
Thus, while the distinctive connection doctrine has helped to advance 
indigenous rights of title, tenure, and participation, it may also offer a 
means of addressing environmental impacts bound up with indigenous 
communities’ relationship to the land and environment. This would give 
rise to a property right beyond title and the exclusion of a trespasser—one 
that protects the deeper ecological values which appear to be inherent in 
this distinctive connection. 
 
 
 323. It may be fair to ask not only how this doctrine might give voice to unasserted indigenous 
environmental claims, but also what implications it may have for peoples and communities not seen as 
indigenous. While this article documents repeated assertions of a unique land connection on behalf of 
indigenous peoples (indeed, for many this has become a discourse about identity), it invites the 
question of whether a distinctive connection analysis could be made for other communities with 
deeply rooted relationships to the land or natural resources. This is not to diminish the understanding 
apparently reached by the international community—that indigenous peoples have such a 
relationship—but merely to ask whether this understanding might be extended to those who are 
demonstrably similarly situated. Certainly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights did not hesitate 
to recognize the spiritual connection of inhabitants of Moiwana Village though they were descendants 
of escaped slaves and not earlier arrivals. Even the Awas Tingni court set aside allegations that the 
claimants in that case were relatively recent arrivals (hundreds rather than thousands of years) to the 
land they sought to defend. The question of a distinctive connection is one of substance, not label. 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore this broader theme, it may well warrant future 
investigation. 
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